### 1AC

### 1AC Solvency

#### **First, there are large reserves waiting to be drilled in Cuba**

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A U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba’s offshore¶ oil fields hold at least four and a half billion barrels of recoverable¶ oil and ten trillion cubic feet of natural gas.29 Cupet, the¶ state-owned Cuban energy company, insists that actual reserves¶ are double that of the U.S. estimate.30 One estimate indicates¶ that Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil per day.31¶ Given this vast resource, Cuba has already leased offshore oil¶ exploration blocks to operators from Spain, Norway, and India.32¶ Offshore oil discoveries in Cuba are placing increasing pressure¶ for the United States to end the embargo. First, U.S. energy companies¶ are eager to compete for access to Cuban oil reserves.33¶ Secondly, fears of a Cuban oil spill are argued to warrant U.S.¶ investment and technology.34 Finally, the concern over Cuban¶ offshore drilling renews cries that the embargo is largely a failure¶ and harms human rights.

#### Cuban government would say yes

Franks 8 Jeff Franks – Havana correspondent for Reuter’s – New York Times – 6/12/2008¶ http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-cubaoil.4.13670441.html?\_r=0

Representative Jeff Flake, an Arizona Republican who has introduced bills in Congress to lift the embargo for oil companies, said the environmental argument might be crucial because there was much concern in Florida about potential oil spills.¶ "If there are going to be oil rigs off of Florida, I think most Americans would be more comfortable if they were U.S. oil rigs, rather than Chinese for example," Flake said.¶ He said U.S. companies were definitely interested in Cuba, but have not publicly pushed for embargo change. During interviews, industry executives emphasized they did not oppose the embargo because it was U.S. national policy and were pushing instead for access to U.S. areas that were currently prohibited, like offshore western Florida.¶ "When U.S. companies are not even allowed to drill in the eastern half of the Gulf of Mexico, we have a long way to go before we can think about international waters off the coast of Cuba," said J.Larry Nichols, chairman of Devon Energy, an independent U.S. oil and natural gas producer.¶ Cuba has said it would welcome U.S. companies to its offshore field and showed its interest by sending Cubapetroleo representatives to a 2006 conference in Mexico City that included companies like the U.S. oil giant Exxon Mobil and the top independent U.S. refiner, Valero Energy.

#### US oil companies will say yes

Benjamin-Alvarado 10 Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication – obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 17

There has been no lack of interest on the part of American international oil firms in developing a Cuban market for joint-venture projects and technology transfer and production-sharing agreements in the energy sector. The prevailing Cuban model of joint-venture investment and cooperation has proved to be attractive internationally, and Cuba offers American firms numerous opportunities of this type. There will have to be significant changes to the Cuban embargo before this type of engagement can occur, but recent history shows that Cuba possesses the potential to be a strong regional trade partner in the area of energy and infrastructure development. The numerous joint-venture projects presently under way in energy development and infrastructure (oil refineries, pipelines, and port facilities) between Cuba and a growing list of foreign partners is a positive indicator of that potential.

### 1AC Plan

#### The Plan: As they pertain to crude oil reservoirs, the United States federal government should lift its restrictions that preclude firms from exploring, extracting, refining, importing, or coordinating engineering and safety protocols with the Republic of Cuba.

### 1AC Spills

#### **Drilling is inevitable—Russia coming within the next six months**

Tamayo 5/31—Juan Tamayo, writer for the Miami Herald (“Russian oil company suspends exploration in Cuba”, 5/31/13, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/31/3424471/russian-oil-company-suspends.html>, zs)

A Russian state oil company drilling off Cuba’s northern shores has reportedly confirmed that it is temporarily halting its exploration — the fourth disappointment for Cuba’s dreams of energy self-sufficiency in less than two years.¶ The announcement by Zarubezhneft signaled an end to the only active exploration program on the island, which now relies on highly subsidized oil from the beleaguered Venezuelan government of President Nicolas Maduro.¶ Zarubezhneft confirmed this week that it was halting work due to “geological” problems but added that it will resume its exploration next year, the Reuters news agency reported Thursday in a dispatch from Havana.¶ The Russians withdrawal had been expected because the Norwegian company that owns the drilling platform they have been leasing, the Songa Mercur, already had announced that it would be leaving Cuban waters in July for another contract.¶ Zarubezhneft’s confirmation, nevertheless, signals “another disappointment” for Cuba’s dreams of finding oil in its waters, said Jorge Pinon, a Cuba energy expert at the University of Texas in Austin.¶ The U.S. Geological Survey has estimated that Cuba’s offshore waters have “significant undiscovered conventional oil potential” — between 4.6 billion and 9.3 billion barrels. Cuban officials estimate the potential reserves at 20 billion.¶ “This is the second geological area in Cuba that … seemed to be promising,” Pinon said of Zarubezhneft’s exploration block. But finding the oil means “you have to go into your pocket to drill exploratory wells.”¶ Spain’s Repsol oil company spent $100 million in the early part of 2012 unsuccessfully exploring with the Scarabeo 9 drilling platform, especially built in China to avoid the restrictions of the U.S. embargo, in deep waters northwest of Havana.¶ Petronas of Malaysia, Russia’s Gazprom and Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) later leased the Scarabeo platform but also struck out, and the rig left Cuban waters at the end of last year.¶ Zarubezhneft then gave it a try, leasing the Songa Mercur to explore waters not as deep and east of Havana starting late last year. Neighboring Bahamas also has expressed interest in that area, but the Russians also drilled a dry hole.¶ The Russians are considered likely to meet their promise to return next year because President Vladimir Putin’s government has been pushing hard to warm up political and commercial ties with Moscow’s one-time allies in Havana.¶ Cuba’s oil explorations have caused concern among U.S. environmentalists and tourism officials that any spills would impact the entire Eastern Seaboard, from the Florida Keys to Cape Cod in Massachusetts.¶ Supporters of improving U.S. relations with Cuba argued that Washington should allow American oil firms to get a piece of the potential profits. The U.S. embargo adds about 20 percent to that island’s exploration costs, according to Cuban officials.

#### **Cuba drilling inevitable—new rigs outside of Mariel being explored**

Gonzalez 3/4—Ivet Gonzalez, correspondent for IPS Cuba (“Cuba Diversifies – But Energy Focus Still on Oil”, 3/4/13, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/03/cuba-diversifies-but-energy-focus-still-on-oil/>, zs)

In January 2012, the Scarabeo 9 drilling rig was brought to Cuba from Asia to sink an exploratory well into the seabed in the Gulf of Mexico. Cuba estimates that there could be up to 20 billion barrels of oil reserves in a 112,000-square kilometre area, although the United States projects a total of about five billion barrels.¶ But in November, Cuba’s Ministry of Basic Industry announced that the rig would be removed from Cuba, after three failed attempts to find a commercially viable well, financed by PDVSA, Spain’s Repsol, PC Gulf – a subsidiary of Malaysia’s Petronas – and Gazpromneft of Russia.¶ After this harsh blow, Cupet reported that the Moscow-based firm Zarubezhneft would explore for oil off north-central Cuba using the Norwegian-owned Songa Mercur drilling platform. The Russian state-run company is drilling a 6,500-metre well in an endeavour that is expected to take six months.¶ The Cuban government has not lost hope that the country will manage to become self-sufficient in energy. In another important development zone, around the port of El Mariel in the province of Artemisa, bordering Havana, the plan is to create a support base for future oil industry activity.¶ But the need to diversify the energy supply is increasingly seen as a priority in Cuba’s current economic reform process.

#### **Cuban safety is insufficient—absent the plan spills reach Florida in 6 days**

Bert and Clayton 12—Melissa Bert and Blake Clayton, Military fellow and fellow for energy and national security CFR (“Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill”, 3/12, <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oil-spill/p27515>, zs)

Washington cannot count on the technical know-how of Cuba's unseasoned oil industry to address a spill on its own. Oil industry experts doubt that it has a strong understanding of how to prevent an offshore oil spill or stem a deep-water well blowout. Moreover, the site where the first wells will be drilled is a tough one for even seasoned response teams to operate in. Unlike the calm Gulf of Mexico, the surface currents in the area where Repsol will be drilling move at a brisk three to four knots, which would bring oil from Cuba's offshore wells to the Florida coast within six to ten days. Skimming or burning the oil may not be feasible in such fast-moving water. The most, and possibly only, effective method to respond to a spill would be surface and subsurface dispersants. If dispersants are not applied close to the source within four days after a spill, uncontained oil cannot be dispersed, burnt, or skimmed, which would render standard response technologies like containment booms ineffective.

#### **Absent experts accidents are inevitable—embargo blocks use**

Bolstad 12—Erika Bolstad, writer for McClatchy newspaper (“Cuba embargo could threaten oil-drilling safety, expert says”, 5/10/12, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/05/10/148433/cuba-embargo-could-threaten-oil.html#.Ug0gFGTwKkZ>, zs)

The 50-year-old U.S. embargo of Cuba is getting in the way of safety when it comes to deepwater drilling in Cuban waters, an expert on the communist country’s offshore drilling activity said Thursday.¶ Lee Hunt, the former president of the International Association of Drilling Contractors, warned that Cold War-era economic sanctions threaten not only Florida’s economy and environment but that of Cuba, too, in the event of a major disaster on the scale of 2010’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The worst-case scenario is "state-sponsored chaos at a disaster site," Hunt said during an event sponsored by the Center for International Policy, a Washington think tank that advocates for a foreign policy based on human rights.¶ The U.S. Coast Guard has extensive response plans, as does the state of Florida. But Hunt said he would give prevention efforts an "F" grade. He likened the work to stocking body bags for a plane crash – but not training pilots to fly safely or to maintain aircraft properly.¶ "We’re getting ready for what will inevitably happen if we don’t take the right proactive steps," Hunt said.¶ His warning and that of other experts came as the Spanish oil company Repsol is about to tap an offshore reservoir beneath 5,600 feet of seawater and about 14,000 feet of rock. The company, the first of many set to drill for oil off Cuba’s coast, is working just 77 nautical miles from Key West.¶ Workers are about a week from completing their drilling and are beginning the technically demanding phase of capping the well and preparing it for possible production, the panelists at the event said.¶ Former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency chief William Reilly, who along with former Florida Sen. Bob Graham co-chaired the presidential commission that examined BP’s Deepwater Horizon spill, said that in his most recent visit to Cuba he was reassured that Repsol was moving slowly in Cuban waters to avoid any surprises. Dan Whittle of the Environmental Defense Fund said that in his visits to Cuba, well-thumbed copies of the commission’s report looked as though they were "read even more in Havana than here."¶ Reilly also noted that Cuban officials are regular readers of daily bulletins from U.S. agencies on U.S. oil drilling regulations. He said he urged them to follow Mexican offshore guidelines – which he said are based on U.S. rules.¶ "Nobody is predicting a catastrophe in association with anything that the Cubans are overseeing," Reilly said. "In every way, the Cuban approach to this is responsible, careful and attentive to the risks that they know they’re undertaking."¶ "Nevertheless, should there be a need for a response . . . the United States government has not interpreted its sanctions policy in a way that would clearly make available in advance the kind of technologies that would be required," Reilly said.

#### **Independently hurricanes cause spills and spread oil**

Stephens et al 11—Sarah Stephens, Executive director for Democracies of the Americas (“As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest”, 2011, <http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf>, zs)

The BP disaster highlights the needs for a timely response to spills, the¶ containment of damage, and clean-up. There were approximately eight rigs¶ capable of drilling relief wells to the depth of Macondo that were available¶ in the Gulf. If the blow-out occurred in Cuban territorial water, the embargo¶ would not allow rigs capable of drilling relief wells to be contracted by the¶ operator (Repsol or CUPET, in the first instance).¶ Companies under the current rules cannot hire a U.S. firm to drill a relief¶ well. In fact, legislation¶ 50¶ introduced in the U.S. Congress in 2010 would have¶ penalized such activities under The Helms-Burton Act.¶ 51¶ Of greater risk and concern, however, is that spills are often more likely¶ because of hurricane activity prevalent in the Gulf, and are exacerbated by¶ the role hurricanes play in spreading oil after a spill.¶ 52¶ In the event of a spill, were assistance from U.S. firms permitted, relief¶ would take 24–48 hours to arrive on scene. Barring their participation, ¶ however, it would take 30–50 days for help to arrive from Brazil, Northern¶ Europe, Africa, or S.E. Asia. In the case of the BP spill, as Lee Hunt said,¶ “Admiral Landry¶ 53¶ (8th Coast Guard District Commander) had personnel¶ 24 hours x 7 days a week on phones to get booms; can Repsol or any¶ subsequent operator do that?”¶ 54¶ OFAC, the Treasury Department office that administers and enforces trade¶ sanctions, has authority to issue licenses on an emergency basis, but the BP¶ spill shows that the early, critical response needed would be made slower by¶ the time required to procure licenses.¶ 55¶ The Obama administration argues that¶ some firms are pre-cleared to respond. But experts say the current scheme¶ makes it impossible to pre-clear the correct technology, and that much more¶ needs to be done—and can be done—under current law.

#### **Aff boosts reaction time—US experts solve best**

Zakaria 11—Fareed Zakaria, Host and journalist on CNN about US foreign policy (“Why our Cuba embargo could lead to another Gulf oil disaster”, 9/19/11, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/19/why-our-cuba-policy-could-lead-to-another-gulf-oil-spill/>, zs)

Can you remember what explosive crisis America and the world was fixated on last summer? It wasn't the deficit, jobs or Europe. It was an oil disaster. Remember the BP spill? Tons of crude gushing into the Gulf of Mexico? Well, in the weeks and months that followed, there was a lot of discussion about how to make sure it didn't happen again.¶ But what struck me this week is that we have a new dangerous drilling zone right on our doorstep - Cuba. Estimates suggest that the island nation has reserves of anywhere from 5 billion to 20 billion barrels of oil. The high end of those estimates would put Cuba among the top dozen oil producers in the world.¶ Predictably, there's a global scramble for Havana. A Chinese-constructed drilling rig is owned by an Italian oil company and is on its way to Cuban waters. Spain's Repsol, Norway's Statoil and India's ONGC will use the 53,000 ton rig to explore for oil. Petro giants from Brazil, Venezuela, Malaysia and Vietnam are also swooping in.¶ Of course, we can't partake because we don't trade with Cuba. But what about at least making sure there are some safety procedures that are followed that would protect the American coastline? You see at 5,500 feet below sea level, these oil rigs off Cuba will go even deeper than the Deepwater Horizon rig that blew up on our coast last year, and the coast of Florida, remember, is just 60 miles away from Cuban waters.¶ What happens if there's another oil spill? Will it be easy and quick to clean up? No. You see, the nearest and best experts on safety procedures and dealing with oil spills are all American, but we are forbidden by our laws from being involved in any way with Cuba. Our trade embargo on Cuba not only prevents us from doing business with our neighbor but it also bars us from sending equipment and expertise to help even in a crisis. So, if there is an explosion, we will watch while the waters of the Gulf Coast get polluted. Now, this is obviously a worst case hypothetical, but it's precisely the kind of danger we should plan for and one we can easily protect against if we were allowed to have any dealings with Cuba.¶ This whole mess is an allegory for a larger problem. We imposed an embargo on Cuba at the height of the Cold War, 52 years ago, when we were worried about Soviet expansion and the spread of communism. Well, there is no more Soviet Union, and I don't think there's a person in the world who believes America could be infected by Cuban communism today. But the antique policies remain - antique and failed policies. They were designed, you recall, to force regime change in Cuba. Well, the Castros have thrived for five decades, using American hostility as a badge of Cuban nationalism. All the embargo has done is to weaken the Cuban people, keep them impoverished and cut them off from the world.

#### **Oil spills spread and kills biodiversity ecosystems**

Almeida 12—Robert Almeida, former Naval Officer and partner at gCaptain (“Drilling Off Cuba, and How the Embargo Could be Very Costly for the US”, 5/18/12, <http://gcaptain.com/drilling-cuba-embargo-badly/>, zs)

In short however, Cuba’s access to containment systems, offshore technology, and spill response equipment is severely restricted by the US embargo, yet if a disaster occurs offshore, not only will Cuban ecosystems be severely impacted, but those of the Florida Keys, and US East Coast.¶ If disaster strikes offshore Cuba, US citizens will have nobody else to blame except the US Government because outdated policies are impacting the ability to prepare sufficiently for real-life environmental threats. Considering Cuba waters are home to the highest concentration of biodiversity in the region and is a spawning ground for fish populations that migrate north into US waters, a Cuban oil spill could inflict unprecedented environmental devastation if not planned for in advance.

#### Biodiversity in specific hotspots checks extinction— key to ag, medicine

Mittermeier 11 (et al, Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, From Chapter One of the book Biodiversity Hotspots http://www.academia.edu/1536096/Global\_biodiversity\_conservation\_the\_critical\_role\_of\_hotspots)

Extinction is the gravest consequence of the biodiversity crisis, since it is¶ irreversible. Human activities have elevated the rate of species extinctions to a¶ thousand or more times the natural background rate (Pimm et al. 1995). What are the¶ consequences of this loss? Most obvious among them may be the lost opportunity¶ for future resource use. Scientists have discovered a mere fraction of Earth’s species¶ (perhaps fewer than 10%, or even 1%) and understood the biology of even fewer¶ (Novotny et al. 2002). As species vanish, so too does the health security of every¶ human. Earth’s species are a vast genetic storehouse that may harbor a cure for¶ cancer, malaria, or the next new pathogen – cures waiting to be discovered.¶ Compounds initially derived from wild species account for more than half of all¶ commercial medicines – even more in developing nations (Chivian and Bernstein¶ 2008). Natural forms, processes, and ecosystems provide blueprints and inspiration¶ for a growing array of new materials, energy sources, hi-tech devices, and¶ other innovations (Benyus 2009). The current loss of species has been compared¶ to burning down the world’s libraries without knowing the content of 90% or¶ more of the books. With loss of species, we lose the ultimate source of our crops¶ and the genes we use to improve agricultural resilience, the inspiration for¶ manufactured products, and the basis of the structure and function of the ecosystems¶ that support humans and all life on Earth (McNeely et al. 2009). Above and beyond¶ material welfare and livelihoods, biodiversity contributes to security, resiliency,¶ and freedom of choices and actions (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).¶ Less tangible, but no less important, are the cultural, spiritual, and moral costs¶ inflicted by species extinctions. All societies value species for their own sake,¶ and wild plants and animals are integral to the fabric of all the world’s cultures¶ (Wilson 1984). The road to extinction is made even more perilous to people by the loss of the broader ecosystems that underpin our livelihoods, communities, and economies(McNeely et al.2009). The loss of coastal wetlands and mangrove forests, for example, greatly exacerbates both human mortality and economic damage from tropical cyclones (Costanza et al.2008; Das and Vincent2009), while disease outbreaks such as the 2003 emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in East Asia have been directly connected to trade in wildlife for human consumption(Guan et al.2003). Other consequences of biodiversity loss, more subtle but equally damaging, include the deterioration of Earth’s natural capital. Loss of biodiversity on land in the past decade alone is estimated to be costing the global economy $500 billion annually (TEEB2009). Reduced diversity may also reduce resilience of ecosystems and the human communities that depend on them. For example, more diverse coral reef communities have been found to suffer less from the diseases that plague degraded reefs elsewhere (Raymundo et al.2009). As Earth’s climate changes, the roles of species and ecosystems will only increase in their importance to humanity (Turner et al.2009).¶ In many respects, conservation is local. People generally care more about the biodiversity in the place in which they live. They also depend upon these ecosystems the most – and, broadly speaking, it is these areas over which they have the most control. Furthermore, we believe that all biodiversity is important and that every nation, every region, and every community should do everything possible to conserve their living resources. So, what is the importance of setting global priorities? Extinction is a global phenomenon, with impacts far beyond nearby administrative borders. More practically, biodiversity, the threats to it, and the ability of countries to pay for its conservation vary around the world. The vast majority of the global conservation budget – perhaps 90% – originates in and is spent in economically wealthy countries (James et al.1999). It is thus critical that those globally ﬂexible funds available – in the hundreds of millions annually – be guided by systematic priorities if we are to move deliberately toward a global goal of reducing biodiversity loss.¶ The establishment of priorities for biodiversity conservation is complex, but can be framed as a single question. Given the choice, where should action toward reducing the loss of biodiversity be implemented ﬁrst? The ﬁeld of conservation planning addresses this question and revolves around a framework of vulnerability and irreplaceability (Margules and Pressey2000). Vulnerability measures the risk to the species present in a region – if the species and ecosystems that are highly threatened are not protected now, we will not get another chance in the future. Irreplaceability measures the extent to which spatial substitutes exist for securing biodiversity. The number of species alone is an inadequate indication of conserva-tion priority because several areas can share the same species. In contrast, areas with high levels of endemism are irreplaceable. We must conserve these places because the unique species they contain cannot be saved elsewhere. Put another way, biodiversity is not evenly distributed on our planet. It is heavily concentrated in certain areas, these areas have exceptionally high concentrations of endemic species found nowhere else, and many (but not all) of these areas are the areas at greatest risk of disappearing because of heavy human impact.¶ Myers’ seminal paper (Myers1988) was the ﬁrst application of the principles of irreplaceability and vulnerability to guide conservation planning on a global scale. Myers described ten tropical forest “hotspots” on the basis of extraordinary plant endemism and high levels of habitat loss, albeit without quantitative criteria for the designation of “hotspot” status. A subsequent analysis added eight additional hotspots, including four from Mediterranean-type ecosystems (Myers 1990).After adopting hotspots as an institutional blueprint in 1989, Conservation Interna-tional worked with Myers in a ﬁrst systematic update of the hotspots. It introduced two strict quantitative criteria: to qualify as a hotspot, a region had to contain at least 1,500 vascular plants as endemics (¶ >¶ 0.5% of the world’s total), and it had to have 30% or less of its original vegetation (extent of historical habitat cover)remaining. These efforts culminated in an extensive global review (Mittermeier et al.1999) and scientiﬁc publication (Myers et al.2000) that introduced seven new hotspots on the basis of both the better-deﬁned criteria and new data. A second systematic update (Mittermeier et al.2004) did not change the criteria, but revisited the set of hotspots based on new data on the distribution of species and threats, as well as genuine changes in the threat status of these regions. That update redeﬁned several hotspots, such as the Eastern Afromontane region, and added several others that were suspected hotspots but for which sufﬁcient data either did not exist or were not accessible to conservation scientists outside of those regions. Sadly, it uncovered another region – the East Melanesian Islands – which rapid habitat destruction had in a short period of time transformed from a biodiverse region that failed to meet the “less than 30% of original vegetation remaining” criterion to a genuine hotspot.

#### Caribbean is one such hotspot

CEPF ’10 (quoting Mittermeier -- the same author that establishes the “hotspot” thesis and writes our impact ev. , Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, “Ecosystem Profile: THE CARIBBEAN ISLANDS BIODIVERSITY HOTSPOT” Jan 15th – http://www.cepf.net/Documents/Final\_Caribbean\_EP.pdf)

The Caribbean Islands Hotspot is one of the world’s greatest centers of biodiversity and¶ endemism, yet its biodiversity and the natural¶ services it provides are highly threatened. Although¶ the islands have protected areas systems, most ar¶ e inadequately managed and important areas lack¶ protection. This strategy will ensure that CEPF¶ funds are employed in the most effective manner¶ and generate significant conservation results that¶ not only complement the actions of other¶ stakeholders but also enable significant expansion¶ of strategic conservation for the benefit of all.¶ Everyone depends on Earth’s ecosystems and their life-sustaining benefits, such as clean air,¶ fresh water and healthy soils. Founded in 2000,¶ the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF)¶ has become a global leader in en¶ abling civil society to participate in and benefit from conserving¶ some of the world’s most critical ecosystems. C¶ EPF is a joint initiative of l'Agence Française de¶ Développement, Conservation International, the Gl¶ obal Environment Facility, the Government of¶ Japan, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the World Bank. As one of the¶ founding partners, Conservation International ad¶ ministers the global program through a CEPF¶ Secretariat.¶ CEPF provides grants for nongovern¶ mental and other private organizations to help protect¶ biodiversity hotspots, Earth’s most biologically¶ rich and threatened areas. The convergence of¶ critical areas for conservation with millions¶ of people who are impoverished and highly¶ dependent on healthy ecosystems is more ev¶ ident in the hotspots than anywhere else.¶ CEPF is unique among funding mechanisms in th¶ at it focuses on biological areas rather than¶ political boundaries and examines conservation th¶ reats on a landscape-scale basis. A fundamental¶ purpose of CEPF is to ensure that civil society is¶ engaged in efforts to conserve biodiversity in¶ the hotspots, and to this end, CEPF provides ci¶ vil society with an agile and flexible funding¶ mechanism complementing funding currently¶ available to government agencies.¶ CEPF promotes working alliances among commun¶ ity groups, nongovernmental organizations¶ (NGOs), government, academic institutions and¶ the private sector, combining unique capacities¶ and eliminating duplication of efforts for a¶ comprehensive approach to conservation. CEPF¶ targets trans-boundary cooperation for areas rich of¶ biological value that straddle national borders¶ or in areas where a regional approach may be more effective than a national approach.¶ A recent, updated analysis reveals the existence of¶ 34 biodiversity hotspots, each holding at least¶ 1,500 endemic plant species, and having lost at¶ least 70 percent of its original habitat extent¶ (Mittermeier¶ et al¶ . 2005). The Caribbean islands qualify as one of these global biodiversity¶ hotspots by virtue of their high endemicity and high degree of threat.¶ The Caribbean Islands Hotspot is exceptionally important for global biodiversity conservation.¶ The hotspot includes important ecosystems, fro¶ m montane cloud forests to coral reefs, and¶ supports populations of unique species amounting to at least 2 percent of the world’s total¶ species.

#### **Another major spill would crush the economy—this assumes BP**

National Commission 11—National Commission, chaired by William Reilly former president of WWF and administrator of the EPA (“The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling”, 2011, <http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf>, zs)

Chapters 4 through 7 lay out the results of our investigation in detail, highlighting the¶ crucial issues we believe must inform policy going forward: the specific engineering and¶ operating choices made in drilling the Macondo well, the attempts to contain and respond¶ to the oil spill, and the impacts of the spill on the region’s natural resources, economy, and¶ people—in the context of the progressive degradation of the Mississippi Delta environment. ¶ Chapters 8 through 10 present our recommendations for reforms in business practices,¶ regulatory oversight, and broader policy concerns. We recognize that the improvements¶ we advocate all come with costs and all will take time to implement. But inaction, as we¶ are deeply aware, runs the risk of real costs, too: in more lost lives, in broad damage to¶ the regional economy and its long-term viability, and in further tens of billions of dollars¶ of avoidable clean-up costs. Indeed, if the clear challenges are not addressed and another¶ disaster happens, the entire offshore energy enterprise is threatened—and with it, the¶ nation’s economy and security. We suggest a better option: build from this tragedy in a¶ way that makes the Gulf more resilient, the country’s energy supplies more secure, our¶ workers safer, and our cherished natural resources better protected.

#### Econ decline causes global conflict - studies

Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

### 1AC Russia

#### Cuba-Russia relations are increasing and will cause war---boosting US-Cuba relations solves

Inter-American Dialogue 12 (U.S. based think tank for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs, “Are External Tensions Entangling Latin American Countries?” http://www.cepr.net/documents/CEPR\_News/LAA120810.pdf)

A Stephen Johnson, senior fellow and director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: "It may or may not be true that Russia's government is seeking to build resupply bases for its navy in Cuba, Vietnam and the Seychelles islands. While Russian navy officials say 'da,' the foreign ministry says 'nyet.' Similar talk of establishing bases elsewhere, such as Venezuela, has not materialized. In any case, it would not present a direct threat unless such a facility became an entry point for hostile arms similar to the nuclear-tipped missiles that provoked the 1962 crisis. Like any other state, Russia can strike diplomatic agreements to base military units in other countries. On the other hand, it would be a challenge. First, it would rekindle a military relationship that ended when Russia transferred its signals intelligence facility at Lourdes to the Cuban government in 2002. A new base might be a shot in the arm to the Cuban economy, helping the Castro brothers hang on to aspects of their old command economy without going cold turkey for market reforms. A base could also serve as a hub for military weapons sales to other Latin American nations when the region needs help in fighting transnational crime. The Soviet Union fell more than 20 years ago, but Russia still has large military industries and needs to sell arms more than washing machines. Its prime customers would, like Cuba, be in the Bolivarian alliance. Second, a Russian navy station in Cuba might complicate U.S. politics, specifically any plans a U.S. administration might have to hand back Guantanamo Naval Base in the near future, for which Cuba's current government refuses to cash our rent checks. At a time when U.S. Northern and Southern Commands are gearing more toward military support for civilian law enforcement missions, it would reintroduce a strategic deterrence component into joint exercises and training. That might not be a bad thing, but it would argue for more U.S. defense spending on the Western Hemisphere. All of which seems to argue that recent threat trends in the Americas are not very predictive and that certain old alliances won't go easily into the sunset."¶ A Stephen Wilkinson, chairman of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba: "Russia is in military talks with Cuba for three reasons. One is economic, related to Russian investment in Cuban nickel and oil and the need to guarantee protection of these investments. Another factor is geostrategic. Recent events in Syria have confirmed Russian fears of the long-term strategic aims of the United States. The Russians are very aware that the United States and Western Europe have been supporting the rebels in Syria and they see this as an indirect attack upon their interests as Assad provides them with a naval base at Tartus, on the Mediterranean. The third reason is possibly rather more personal, Vladimir Putin has turned his face against Washington since his recent re-election because he perceived a U.S. hand in organizing the protests against him. From Cuba's point of view, having a Russian military base would be a guarantee of security since it would mean that U.S. military action against it would be less likely. If Washington would not wish for Havana to have such an ally, it ought to reconsider its own policy toward the island. At present, the embargo, and especially the Helms Burton Law, makes it sensible for the Cuban government to seek alliances with as many powers as possible in order to protect itself. U.S. military presence in Latin America has grown in recent years. There are now 24 bases including two new ones in Chile and Argentina. Seven bases in Colombia are being expanded. The justification for this expansion is the war on drugs and for humanitarian intervention purposes. However, it should come as no surprise that this is not the way that Cuba or its closest allies such as Hugo Chávez or Evo Morales view them. They see the bases as potential threats to their independence and sovereignty and a sign that Washington's hegemonic designs on the region are very much alive."¶ A Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow and director of the Cuba Project at the Center for International Policy: "Given the history of the 1962 U.S.-Soviet missile crisis, for the Russians now to propose exploring with the Cubans the setting up of naval bases on the island would seem a rather maladroit idea. The United States made it clear in 1962 that the positioning of offensive nuclear missiles on the island was unacceptable and demanded that they be withdrawn. The world has never been so close to an allout nuclear war. Fortunately, both Kennedy and Khrushchev showed themselves to be sensible men. They reached an understanding under which Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles and Kennedy gave assurances that the United States would not invade Cuba. Subsequently, without informing the United States, the Soviets began building a submarine base on the island, but when it was made clear to them that the United States would consider this a violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding of 1962, work on the base was quietly halted and never resumed. The United States should of course oppose the positioning of Russian bases in Cuba today, as should the other countries of the hemisphere. They would serve no reasonable purpose and could only unnecessarily add to tensions. The United States has not increased its military presence in Latin America. There is no reason for the Russians to do so."

#### Increased Cuba-Russia relations causes war

Richter 08 (Paul, Staff Writer for New York Times, “Moscow-Havana ties worry U.S.” http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/01/world/fg-usrussia1)

But at a time when Russia has intervened forcefully in Georgia and is extending the global reach of its rebuilt military, some senior officials fear it may not be only bluster.¶ Russia "has strategic ties to Cuba again, or at least, that's where they're going," a senior U.S. official said recently, speaking, like others, on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive implications of the assessments.¶ The officials said they doubted the Russians would risk stationing nuclear bombers on Cuba. But some believe that Moscow might seek to restore its once-energetic intelligence cooperation with Havana, and to resume limited military cooperation, possibly including refueling stops for aircraft and warships.¶ In the current environment, such contacts would make U.S. officials uneasy, serving as a reminder of a military relationship between Havana and Moscow that stretched from the Cuban Revolution in 1959 until a weakened, post-Soviet Russia finally closed a massive electronic intelligence complex in Lourdes near Havana in 2001.¶ One senior military officer said a return of Russian ships or planes could force additional U.S. deployments in the region. But the Bush administration and Pentagon declined to comment publicly on the implications.¶ "It is very Cold War retro," said a government official. "The topic could be reminiscent of the Cuban missile crisis, and that is a chapter that people don't want to revisit."¶ The Russian Defense Ministry dismissed a report in the newspaper Izvestia in July that quoted an unidentified Russian official as saying the government intended to begin basing Tupolev Tu-160 Blackjack and Tupolev Tu-95 Bear nuclear bombers in Cuba.¶ However, the report was taken seriously enough in Washington that Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, the new Air Force chief of staff, said during his Senate confirmation hearing at the time that sending the bombers would cross a "red line in the sand."

#### The plan establishes a long-term framework for normalizing relations

Lanier 13—Adam Lanier, UNC School of Law (“In Deepwater: Cuba, Offshore Drilling, and Political Brinkmanship”, 2013, Lexis Nexis)

IV. Recommendations¶ The development of Cuba's offshore oil resources has sparked the interest of a number of academics, foreign policy think tanks, and environmental activist groups. n148 This section of the note will explore several of the more effective options while keeping an eye toward practicality. n149 Due to the disagreement over the direction U.S. policy should take, as evidenced by the various legislative proposals introduced over the past several years, it is unlikely that U.S. policy toward Cuba will change overnight. n150 Nevertheless, making small changes that are in the best interest of both Cuba and the United States, such as loosening restrictions on the ability of private companies to assist Cuba's offshore drilling efforts, can help provide a long-term framework for the normalization of relations on mutually acceptable terms.

#### Normalizing relations with Cuba crowds out Russia

Blank 09 (Stephen, Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical Games in the US’s Neighborhood,” pdf)

The only way in which Russian policy truly threatens the US and Latin America is its military and intelligence support for Chavez and similar leaders. This support is passed on to insurgents while strengthening Chavez and his allies. Adequate responses to such threats are inherently economic and political, and only military as a last resort. ¶ Washington can do much more to facilitate security in Latin America: regenerating its own economy; simultaneously opening up trade markets and eliminating barriers to Latin American exports; enhancing multilateralism and interoperability among defense forces as requested by Latin American militaries; and beginning the normalization of Cuba.¶ Havana is no longer the threat it was, Venezuela has claimed that dubious honor. Rehabilitating Cuba, given that Castro’s days are clearly numbered, would take the air out of Chavez’s balloon; it is quite clear that Havana would probably welcome a path towards better relations with the US, especially the economic benefits they would inevitably bring. A policy with a more symbolically important impact upon Latin America is currently difficult to imagine.¶ Nonetheless, there should be no illusion that the security problems that plague this region are easily overcome, quite the opposite. But that is all the more reason why the US cannot ignore the area and let it drift to Moscow, Tehran, and Beijin for want of a better alternative. That outcome would only confirm once again that in world politics, there is no such thing as benign neglect. Instead neglect is malign and engenders negative results for the negligent state along with those neglected. The policies of the Bush administration allowed Russia to gain a foothold in Latin American politics, a result of Washington’s negligence; under President Obama, the US should reverse those outcomes and demonstrate what liberal democracy in action can truly accomplish.

#### Russian expansion spurs a new Cold War and proxy conflicts

Walle 12 (Walter, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “Russia Turns to the South for Military and Economic Alliances,” <http://www.coha.org/russia-turns-to-the-south-for-military-and-economic-alliances/>)

Quite clearly, Russia’s interest in Latin America is escalating. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, argued in his article, “The New Stage of Development of Russian-Latin American Relations,” that there is great attractiveness in establishing bilateral relations, especially when three of the top twenty emerging economies -Mexico, Brazil and Argentina- are in Latin America.[23] Lavrov has also stated that the Russian Federation has an interest in joining the Inter-American Development Bank, perhaps a move to better accommodate Russian interests in the region, while at the same time neutralizing American influence.¶ Demonstrably, Russia has been developing cooperative relationships with prominent organizational bodies of the region, such as the OAS (Organization of American States), and has ratified visa-free travel agreements with countries like Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. In his article, Lavrov argues that Russia’s intention behind quests for partnerships is the establishment of non-ideologized relationships with Latin American countries, relationships that could be of mutual benefit to all parties involved.¶ However, the Russian stance on Latin America ultimately may be cause for apprehension. The establishment of bilateral, cordial relations between Russia and Latin American countries could evolve to a proxy, neo-Cold War scenario. If the situation in the regions worsens, some countries would be funded and supported by the U.S., while others, including several members of Latin America’s “New Left”, would become the major beneficiaries of Moscow. An analogy of such practice is the Georgia – Russia crisis that surfaced in August of 2008. During this brief war, the U.S. sent military aid to Georgia[24] on warships to territory Russia considers its “backyard” (i.e. the Caucasus and the Black Sea), infuriating Moscow. A month after the conflict erupted, ostensibly in retaliation, Russia sent two Tu-160 bombers to conduct military exercises with Washington’s least favorite nation in Latin America: Venezuela[25]. More importantly, in November of 2008 Moscow conducted war games with Caracas, in which a small Russian fleet was sent to the Caribbean to participate in joint naval maneuvers with the Venezuelan navy.[26] This was a powerful symbolic act: as it was the first time that Russian warships had visited the Caribbean since the Cuban Missile Crisis.¶ In the wake of the post-Georgia conflict, such joint military maneuvers between Russia and Venezuela were revitalized, and helped to build up the tensions between Washington and Moscow, sending strong signals of a Cold War revival. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the declarations of independence by the breakaway regions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Venezuela[27] and Nicaragua[28] were alone among Latin American countries in recognizing the independence of the new republics.

#### That causes miscalculation

Orozco 08 (Jose, Correspondent for Christian Science Monitor, “Cold war echo: Russian military maneuvers with Venezuela,” http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2008/0912/p01s05-woam.html)

The last time a Russian Navy ship plied the azure waters of the Caribbean for major joint maneuvers with an anti-US country was during the cold war.¶ But in a move out of Cuban leader Fidel Castro's historical playbook, Venezuela's Hugo Chávez announced this week that his nation will host four Russian warships and 1,000 troops in November for joint military exercises.¶ That was followed Wednesday by the arrival in Venezuela of two Russian long-range bombers.¶ Although Latin American leaders so far have shrugged off the moves as another act of bravado in Mr. Chávez's push against what he calls "Yankee hegemony," some diplomats and US officials see the potential for real trouble.¶ The US typically ignores the leftist leader's angry tirades, and is playing down the news.¶ Still, an extensive military relationship between Venezuela and Russia could heighten tensions and signal the start of a new regional cold war.¶ "This is a risky step that could provoke the US," says retired Navy Vice Admiral and former Vice Minister of Defense Rafael Huizi Clavier. "Any incident, any error, could bring problems." This week, Russia announced that it will send a naval squadron, including the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great, as well as long-range patrol planes for the upcoming joint exercises with Venezuela.

#### Extinction

Helfand and Pastore 9 [Ira Helfand, M.D., and John O. Pastore, M.D., are past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility. March 31, 2009, “U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat”, http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT\_pastoreline\_03-31-09\_EODSCAO\_v15.bbdf23.html]

President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct. It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today.

### 1AC Hegemony

#### Hegemony is sustainable – but the US must walk carefully – policy choices that endorse multilateral leadership are key

Beckley 2012, Michael Beckley, PHD Columbia, assistant professor of political science at Tufts University specializing in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy, 2012, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited”, PDF, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDkQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Facademiccommons.columbia.edu%2Fcatalog%2Fac%3A146399&ei=I1mZUaOnMMLk0gH9iICoCw&usg=AFQjCNGKp8jw7t-cvRknlrP0qcv6Z7M41w&sig2=EcwCKI0jGPs3NkMrxYYY5g&bvm=bv.46751780,d.dmQ>

The growing consensus in U.S. academic and policymaking circles is that unipolarity is a temporary aberration that soon will be swept away. The most recent National Intelligence Council report, for example, claims that “the international system...will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers” and “will be a global multipolar one.”6 Among academics, “it is widely perceived that the international political system is in flux and that the post-­‐ Cold War era of American preeminence is winding down.”7 Book stores are filled with titles such as The Post-­‐American World, The End of the American Era, When China Rules the World, and Becoming China’s Bitch. And opinion polls show that pluralities of people in most countries believe that China is already the world’s dominant economic power.8 If this conventional wisdom is correct, then the United States faces an extraordinary challenge. The Argument In the pages that follow, I argue that such declinist beliefs are exaggerated and that the alternative perspective more accurately captures the dynamics of the current unipolar era. First, I show that the United States is not in decline. Across most indicators of national power, the United States has maintained, and in some areas increased, its lead over other countries since 1991. Declinists often characterize the expansion of globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens as sufficient conditions for U.S. relative decline. Yet, over the last two decades American economic and military dominance endured while globalization and U.S. hegemony increased significantly. Second, I find that U.S. hegemony is profitable in certain areas. The United States delegates part of the burden of maintaining international security to others while channeling its own resources, and some of its allies resources, into enhancing its own military dominance. It imposes punitive trade measures against others while deterring such measures against its own industries. And it manipulates global technology flows in ways that enhance the technological and military capabilities of itself and allies. Such a privileged position has not provoked significant opposition from other countries. In fact, balancing against the United States has declined steadily since the end of the Cold War. Third, I conclude that globalization benefits the United States more than other countries. Globalization causes innovative activity to concentrate in areas where it is done most efficiently. Because the United States is already wealthy and innovative, it sucks up capital, technology, and people from the rest of the world. Paradoxically, therefore, the diffusion of technology around the globe helps sustain a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States. Taken together, these results suggest that unipolarity will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future. The United States may decline because of some unforeseen disaster, bad policies, or from domestic decay. But the two chief features of the current international system – American hegemony and globalization – both reinforce unipolarity. For scholars, this conclusion implies that the study of unipolarity should become a major research agenda, at least on par with the study of power transitions and hegemonic decline. For policymakers, the results of this study suggest that the United States should not retrench from the world, but rather continue to integrate with the world economy and sustain a significant diplomatic and military presence abroad.

#### Plan solves 2 internal links

#### A. International Credibility through Latin America engagement

Benjamin-Alvadaro 6 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” <http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf>)

Given that there are no formal diplomatic of economic relations between the governments of the United States and Cuba, the level of interest has grown significantly in the 3 years due primarily to three reasons in the following interest areas: energy security interests; broader regional strategic; and purely economic interests. First, the energy security interests in the potential of Cuban oil – although it really would not minimize the immediacy of an American energy crisis – is seen as possible if only partial remedy to energy supply concerns. Second, as Cuba, in part because of the increasing number of oil partnerships furthers its diplomatic and economic ties to with countries like Venezuela, China, Brazil and members of the European Union it may prove to provide Cuba for a sufficient buffer against U.S. opposition as it solidifies it economic and diplomatic role in the region. This is important inasmuch as there is a de facto trend in the Americas that clearly disavows and attempts to minimize the influence of the United States in the region, and with the growing demands on the world economy by China, it stands to reason that Cuba may assume an increasing stature that almost potentially lessens the presence of American influence in Cuban and hence regional affairs. Finally, and as demonstrated by the presence of American oil interests in the February 2006 U.S.- Cuban Energy Summit in Mexico City, there may be interest in cooperating in joint venture projects, and by extension assisting in the long-term development in Cuba’s oil industry. ¶ To accomplish this task the report seeks to lay out some national security policy considerations applying strategic thought to what I will term “Post-Oil” Cuba – a Cuba that has a small but vibrant and growing oil and gas production capacity with extensive relations with a number of partners, and an increasingly positive outlook toward addressing energy and economic development questions that have plagued the Castro regime since the Cuban Revolution.3¶ The primary consideration is to determine the present state of Cuban energy and what possibilities exist that would be available to American foreign policy decision makers and business interests as the relations with Cuba evolve over the coming years.4 This is important because any realistic appraisal of how Cuba is to take advantage of its oil bonanza involves the United States. Previous research in this area has clearly laid out the scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes in the period since the demise of Cuba’s favorable trade arrangements with the former Soviet Union. Recently, and as a result of the oil discovery and Cuba’s energy arrangement with the government of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela there is renewed interest in Havana’s energy policies. Most of that analysis has been focused on concrete possibilities where there can be cooperation in the energy field between these two neighbors. Specifically, the work has looked at areas for the convergence of energy interests as they apply to the near- and long-term energy development scenarios facing both countries. Myers Jaffe and Soligo have addressed this possibility by looking at the potential to increase diversification and dispersion of energy resources. This is an important consideration when one takes into consideration that well over one-third of all oil refining capacity resides on or near the Houston shipping channel. The potential negative impact on America’s refining capacity following Hurricane Rita5 made a significant impression on oil industry analysts for the necessity of diversifying the location of these vital national resources. The potential of viewing Cuba as a “staging area” for American oil storage and refining is plausible because of the proximity of the island. The also becomes more attractive because of the growing climatic concerns over the uncertain security of oil resources in the Gulf region as clearly demonstrated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. While it is true that Venezuela has initiated an investment of $1 billion dollars to bring the Cienfuegos refinery online, there are still many other possibilities open and available to American companies, as well as a growing number of foreign firms.6 Additionally, Venezuela remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that the existing trade arrangements between the U.S. and Venezuela will remain intact, the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and a growing Chinese presence in the region notwithstanding. Additionally, pursuing such a path would allow United States policymakers to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer in the following areas: domestic technical capabilities; continuing human capital development; strategic positioning in the Caribbean, and an improved diplomatic stature. Cuba, by any measure, possesses a largely untapped technical capacity owing to advanced training and education in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly demonstrated by its attempt to develop a nuclear energy capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands of Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with among the highest ratios of scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas. Moreover, the foundation of Cuba’s vaunted public education system remains intact and increased investment under various scenarios suggests that Cuba will continue to produce a welleducated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality. This raises an important consideration that being the role that Cuba will play in the region in the 21st century. It suffices to say that Cuba remains the strategically important state by virtue of its geographical location alone, in efforts against drug and human trafficking and related national and regional security matters. The extent to which a stable Cuban government has cooperated with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts in the past suggests that the results from improved diplomatic relations between neighbors would have the effect of improving national security concerns related to terrorist activity, illicit weapons transfers and the like. Ultimately, a successful normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba in these areas may well enhance and stabilize regional relations that could possibly lessen (or at a minimum, balancing) fears of a Chinese incursion in hemispheric affairs. To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of joint-venture projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and possible success of such an undertaking become available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated and consummated sales to Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than optimal circumstances but have well-served the commercial interests of all parties involved.

#### Specifically US engagement is critical to prevent global war spurring from Latin America

Rochlin 94 James Francis “Discovering the Americas” (Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia Okanagan p. 130-1)

While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security concerns were perhaps more impotant. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of potential decline of US hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining US influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-84 due to wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some US client state in Latin America, in addition to **political repression, underdevelopment, mounting external debt, anti-american sentiment** produced by decades of subjugation to US strategic and economic interest and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Cental American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process thoughout the whole region. Analysts at the time worried that, in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin Ameica, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps **even a hegemonic** war. This is one of the motivation which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contradora, as will be seen in the next chapter.

#### B. Chinese influence

Dowd 12 (Alan, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, “Crisis in the America's,” <http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas>)

Focused on military operations in the Middle East, nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea, and the global threat of terrorism, U.S. policymakers have neglected a growing challenge right here in the Western Hemisphere: the expanding influence and reach of China.¶ Eyeing energy resources to keep its economy humming, China is engaged in a flurry of investing and spending in Latin America.¶ In Costa Rica, China is funding a $1.24-billion upgrade of the country’s oil refinery; bankrolling an $83-million soccer stadium; backing infrastructure and telecommunications improvements; and pouring millions into a new police academy.¶ In Colombia, China is planning a massive “dry canal” to link the country’s Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. At either terminus, there will be Chinese ports; in between, there will be Chinese assembly facilities, logistics operations and distribution plants; and on the Pacific side, there will be dedicated berths to ship Colombian coal outbound to China.¶ In mid-January, a Chinese-built oil rig arrived in Cuba to begin drilling in Cuba’s swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports that Spanish, Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig to extract Cuban oil. For now, China is focusing on onshore oil extraction in Cuba.¶ New offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer. With some 38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast, Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by 2020, as the Washington Times reports, and China has used generous loans to position itself as the prime beneficiary of Brazilian oil. China’s state-run oil and banking giants have inked technology-transfer, chemical, energy and real-estate deals with Brazil. Plus, as the Times details, China came to the rescue of Brazil’s main oil company when it sought financing for its massive drilling plans, pouring $10 billion into the project. A study in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down $3.1 billion for a slice of Brazil’s vast offshore oil fields.¶ The JFQ study reveals just how deep and wide Beijing is spreading its financial influence in Latin America: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; a $16.3-billion commitment to develop Venezuelan oil reserves; $1 billion for Ecuadoran oil; $4.4 billion to develop Peruvian mines; $10 billion to help Argentina modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase Argentina’s petroleum company outright. The New York Times adds that Beijing has lent Ecuador $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant.¶ There is good and bad to Beijing’s increased interest and investment in the Western Hemisphere. Investment fuels development, and much of Latin America is happily accelerating development in the economic, trade, technology and infrastructure spheres. But China’s riches come with strings.¶ For instance, in exchange for Chinese development funds and loans, Venezuela agreed to increase oil shipments to China from 380,000 barrels per day to one million barrels per day. It’s worth noting that the Congressional Research Service has reported concerns in Washington that Hugo Chavez might try to supplant his U.S. market with China. Given that Venezuela pumps an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for the U.S.—or about 11 percent of net oil imports—the results would be devastating for the U.S.¶ That brings us to the security dimension of China’s checkbook diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere.¶ Officials with the U.S. Southern Command conceded as early as 2006 that Beijing had “approached every country in our area of responsibility” and provided military exchanges, aid or training to Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela.¶ The JFQ study adds that China has “an important and growing presence in the region’s military institutions.” Most Latin American nations, including Mexico, “send officers to professional military education courses in the PRC.” In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has begun to sell “sophisticated hardware…such as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft.” The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that Chinese defense firms “are likely to leverage their experience and a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary consequence being that those purchasers will become more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products.”¶ Put it all together, and the southern flank of the United States is exposed to a range of new security challenges.¶ To be sure, much of this is a function of China’s desire to secure oil markets. But there’s more at work here than China’s thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in China’s neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in America’s neighborhood.¶ This is a direct challenge to U.S. primacy in the region—a challenge that must be answered.¶ First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truth—that China’s rulers do not share America’s values—and needs to shape and conduct its China policy in that context.¶ Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China, an estimated 3-5 million people are rotting away in laogai slave-labor camps, many of them “guilty” of political dissent or religious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom of speech and religion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmed citizens. Indeed, Beijing viewed the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political reform, but as reason “to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a decade,” according to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.¶ In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the difference when it comes to foreign and defense policy. As Reagan counseled during the Cold War, “There is no true international security without respect for human rights.”¶ Second, the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily.¶ That means no more allowing trade deals—and the partners counting on them—to languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.¶ Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty.¶ Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has “a deep respect for U.S. military power.” We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last.¶ Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine.¶ Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere.¶ In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

#### Increased influence makes a Chinese invasion of Taiwan inevitable

Ferguson 12 (Robbie, Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, Featured Contributor at International Business Times, Former Conference & Research Assistant at Security Watch, Former Researcher at University College London, Master of Science, China in the International Arena, The University of Glasgow, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/>)

Taiwan – domestic, or foreign policy?¶ China’s goals in the region amount to more than the capture of natural resources. Although the People’s Republic of China considers resolution of the Taiwan issue to be a domestic issue, it is with some irony that one of China’s main foreign policy goals is to isolate Taipei internationally. The PRC and the ROC compete directly for international recognition among all the states in the world. . Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin America, where 12 of the 23 nations that still have official diplomatic relations with the ROC reside.¶ The historical background¶ Following the mainland Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang retreated to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) where it continued to claim to be the legitimate government of all of China. In June 1950 the United States intervened by placing its 7th fleet in the Taiwan straits to stop a conclusive military resolution to the civil war and slowly the battlefield became primarily political, concerned with legitimacy.¶ When the United Nations was formed in 1945, the Republic of China (ROC) became one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This gave the ROC a de facto advantage over the PRC in attaining recognition from other nation states; particularly as the diplomatic clout of the hegemonic United States supported its position as the true representative of the Chinese people, until the rapprochement of the 1970s, when the Nixon administration wished to improve ties with the de facto rulers of China in order to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. UN Resolution 2758 granted the ’China seat’ to the PRC at the expense of the ROC who were in effect exiled from the organization, and the famous 1972 visit of President Nixon to China further added legitimacy to the communist regime. All this resulted in a thawing of world opinion, and gradually as the durability and permanence of the PRC regime became ingrained, countries began switching their diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.¶ The economics of international recognition¶ In the Americas, the PRC had international recognition and longstanding support from ideological allies such as Cuba. However, the ROC has maintained more diplomatic support in the Americas than any other region, mainly due to the small nature of the states involved and the importance of Taiwanese aid to their economies. Li notes that “from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, roughly 10 percent of Taiwan’s direct foreign investment (FDI) went to Latin America and the Caribbean,” [51] highlighting the concerted effort made in the region. Economic solidarity is increasingly important to the formation of the Taiwan-Latin America relationship, for two reasons. The first is that for Latin American states, the decision of which China to support is less ideological and political than it ever has been; which makes the decision a straight up economic zero-sum choice. The second is that Latin America is home to natural resources which are of great significance to the hungry growing economies of the PRC and the ROC regardless of international recognition.¶ However, while the decision is not political for Latin American countries, for Taiwan, every country which switches its recognition to the PRC damages its legitimacy as a nation state in the international arena. The Table below shows the designation of diplomatic recognition in the region in 2008.¶ Countries Recognising the PRC (China)Countries Recognising the ROC (Taiwan)Central AmericaMexico, Costa RicaEl Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, PanamaCaribbeanAntigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad & TobagoBelize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, St Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the GrenadinesSouth AmericaArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, VenezuelaParaguay¶ On the other hand, for the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for the ROC takes it one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the ‘Taiwan issue’ unilaterally. Subsequently, undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it has taken to ‘outbidding’ Taiwan in offers of foreign aid, a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from the defunct Soviet Union, and the West, which is pre occupied with terrorism and the Middle East. Li notes that “the region’s leaders have turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financial assistance, and consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against each other.” [53] Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments on infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts & Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007.¶ However, even Taiwan‘s economy can be put under strain by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid which has brought only debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese cause. This has contributed to the PRC picking off the few remaining supporters of the ROC – take for example, the Dominican case.¶ In early 2004, Commonwealth of Dominica asked Taipei for a $58 million aid, which is unrelated to public welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan to develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic relationship was soon broken after Taipei turned down the request. [54]¶ This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms, the PRC is winning the battle for Latin America.¶ Political strategies of the PRC¶ In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China “provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan,” [55] the reality is that the use of force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China. It refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. Although Domínguez suggests that the PRC “has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan),” [56] the legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question – for example “in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan.” [57] This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly, China’s experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 “the CCP had established relations with almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in Latin America,” [58] further isolating the ROC.¶ The effect on American interests¶ Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin America, the USA would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the West. As China’s economic and political position in the world improves vis-à-vis both America and Taiwan, so might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find itself in a position where it could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, perhaps by force.

#### Draws in the US and causes extinction – impact defense is out dated

Lowther 3/16 William, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3/16/13, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,” <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211>

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new academic report concludes.¶ “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).¶ Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense.¶ “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,” the report says.¶ In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.”¶ The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis.¶ “This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own.¶ The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.”¶ Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US.¶ The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says.¶ “Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says.¶ For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party.¶ To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says.¶ Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.”¶ The report says: “With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”

#### That collapses the biggest internal link to relations – absent the plan Sino-Taiwan war is inevitable

Mazza 1/3 Michael, research fellow in foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute, 1/3/13, “Four Surprises That Could Rock Asia in 2013,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/03/four\_surprises\_that\_could\_rock\_asia\_in\_2012?page=full

Since President Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008, Taipei and Beijing have improved ties and deepened their economic integration: cross-strait trade reached $127.6 billion in 2011, an increase of more than 13 percent from 2010. Some national security experts misinterpret this trend, thinking that growing economic interdependence will overwhelm factors pushing the two sides apart, and that interdependence will provide Beijing with leverage it can use to compel unification. But while Taiwan's businesspeople enjoy closer ties with China, the average Taiwanese voter continues to move toward independence. Over the last 20 years, the portion of citizens of Taiwan identifying as "Taiwanese" has increased from 17.6 percent of those polled in 1992 to a whopping 53.7 percent today; those identifying as "Chinese" has declined over the same period from 25.5 percent to just 3.1 percent today. Support for independence has nearly doubled over the last two decades, from 11.1 percent to 19.6 percent. Support for immediate or eventual unification, meanwhile, has more than halved, from 20 percent in 1992 to 9.8 percent in 2012.¶ Economic integration is apparently failing to halt what Beijing sees as a troubling trend. With a cross-strait trade agreement and a slew of other, easier deals already on the books, Beijing now expects Ma to discuss political issues. But Ma doesn't have the domestic political support to pursue political talks -- in March 2012, two months after his reelection, 45 percent of those polled said the pace of cross-strait exchanges was "just right," but the share of respondents answering "too fast" had increased to 32.6 percent, from 25.7 percent before the election. Any Chinese shift toward a more strident Taiwan policy could portend a new crisis in the Taiwan Strait sooner than many expect, as a lack of progress on these issues may buttress hawks in the new Xi Jinping administration. And America would surely be dragged in: Even low-level coercive measures against Taiwan -- a top 10 U.S. trading partner and security ally -- could throw U.S.-China relations into a tailspin.

#### Multilateral hegemony solves great power wars – the alternative is apolarity

Kempe 2012, Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, a foreign policy think tank and public policy group, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Atlantic Council since December 1, 2006, and is a Visiting Fellow at Oxford University's Saïd Business School, April 18, 2012, “Does America still want to lead the world?”, <http://blogs.reuters.com/thinking-global/2012/04/18/does-america-still-want-to-lead-the-world/>,)

For all their bitter differences, President Obama and Governor Romney share one overwhelming challenge. Whoever is elected will face the growing reality that the greatest risk to global stability over the next 20 years may be the nature of America itself. Nothing – not Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapons, not violent extremists or Mideast instability, not climate change or economic imbalances – will shape the world as profoundly as the ability of the United States to remain an effective and confident world player advocating its traditional global purpose of individual rights and open societies. That was the conclusion of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, a group of experts that was brought together by the World Economic Forum and that I have chaired. Even more intriguing, our group tested our views on, among others, a set of Chinese officials and experts, who worried that we would face a world overwhelmed by chaos if the U.S. – facing resource restraints, leadership fatigue and domestic political dysfunction – disengaged from its global responsibilities. U.S. leadership, with all its shortcomings and missteps, has been the glue and underwriter of global stability since World War Two – more than any other nation. Even with the world experiencing its greatest shift of economic and political power since the 19th century, no other country is emerging – or looks likely to emerge – that would be as prepared or equipped to exercise leadership on behalf of the global good. Yet many in the world are questioning the role of U.S. leadership, the governance architecture it helped create and even the values for which the U.S. stands. Weary from a decade of war and strained financially, Americans themselves are rethinking whether they can afford global purpose. The election campaign is unlikely to shed much light on these issues, yet both candidates face an inescapable truth: How the U.S. evolves over the next 15 to 20 years will be most important single variable (and the greatest uncertainty) hovering over the global future. And the two most important elements that will shape the U.S. course, in the view of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, will be American intentions and the capability to act on them. In short, will Americans continue to see as part of their identity the championing of values such as individual opportunity and open societies that have contributed so richly to the global commons? Second, can the U.S. sufficiently address its domestic challenges to assure its economic, political and societal strength while the world changes at unprecedented velocity? Consider this: It took Great Britain 155 years to double its gross domestic product per capita in the 18th and 19th centuries, when it was the world’s leading power. It took the U.S. 50 years to do the same by 1950, when its population was 152 million. Both India and China have achieved the same growth on a scale and at a pace never experienced before. Both countries have more than a hundred times the population of Britain during its heyday, yet they are achieving similar outcomes in a tenth of the time. Although China will likely surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy by 2030, Americans retain distinct advantages that could allow them to remain the pivotal power. Think of Uncle Sam as a poker player sitting at a global table of cohorts, holding better cards than anyone else: a free and vibrant society, a history of technological innovation, an ability to attract capital and generate jobs, and a relatively young and regenerating population. However, it doesn’t matter how good your cards are if you’re playing them poorly. Put another way, the candidate who wins in November is going to be faced with the reality summed up by the cartoon character Pogo in 1971 as he was trying to make his way through a prickly primeval forest without proper footwear: “We have met the enemy and he is us.” Imagine two very different scenarios for the world, based on how America rises to its challenges. The positive scenario would require whoever is elected in November to be a unifier, someone who can rise above our current squabbles and galvanize not only the U.S. but also the world around a greater understanding of this historic moment. He would address the larger U.S. issues of failing infrastructure, falling educational standards, widening deficits and spiraling healthcare costs. He would partner more effectively with rising powers, and China in particular. And he would recognize and act upon the strategic stake the U.S. has in a politically confident, economically healthy Europe. The doubling of the global middle class by a billion people by 2030 plays into U.S. political and economic strengths, increasing demand for the products and services of information technology where the U.S. excels. Developments that improve the extraction of shale natural gas and oil provide the U.S. and some of its allies disproportionate benefits. Under this positive scenario, the U.S. could log growth rates of 2.7 percent or more each year, compared with 2.5 percent over the past 20 years. Average living standards could rise by 40 percent through 2030, keeping alive the American dream and restoring the global attractiveness of the U.S. model. The negative scenario results from a U.S. that fails to rise to its current challenges. Great powers decline when they fail to address the problems they recognize. U.S. growth could slow to an average of 1.5 percent per year, if that. The knock-on impact on the world economy could be a half-percent per year. The shift in the perception of the U.S. as a descending power would be more pronounced. This sort of United States would be increasingly incapable of leading and disinclined to try. It is an America that would be more likely to be protectionist and less likely to retool global institutions to make them more effective. One can already see hints of what such a world would look like. Middle Eastern diplomats in Washington say the failure of the U.S. to orchestrate a more coherent and generous transatlantic and international response to their region’s upheavals has resulted in a free-for-all for influence that is favoring some of the least enlightened players. Although the U.S. has responded to the euro zone crisis, as a result of its own economic fears, it hasn’t offered a larger vision for the transatlantic future that recognizes its enormous strategic stake in Europe’s future, given global shifts of influence. The U.S. played a dominant role in reconstructing the post-World War Two international order. The question is whether it will do so again or instead contribute to a dangerous global power vacuum that no one over the next two decades is willing or capable of filling.

#### AND – American involvement is inevitable – decline causes lash out and great power wars

Brzezinski 12 Zbigniew, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, PHD, JAN/FEB, “After America”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>,)

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

#### Heg prevents Indo-Pak War – goes nuclear

Brzezinski ‘04 [Zbigniew, (Former Sect. Of State) The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, Perseus, New York]

For the time being. the key US. interest is to prevent a nuclear war from erupting between Pakistan and India and to discourage any further regional proliferation, especially since there can he little doubt that the once-imperial and nationally ambitious Iran looks with under­standable envy at its nuclear-armed neighbors. Of the two goals, the prevention of a nuclear war may be somewhat easier to pursue because the very possession of nuclear weaponry is forcing both the Indian and the Pakistani militaries to calculate more cautiously the potential con­sequences of their periodic border clashes. Nonetheless, the unresolved issue of Kashmir is bound to pro­duce repeated collisions, each of which inflames the volatile and reli­giously conflicted Muslim and Hindu masses. Pakistan could then even become a fundamentalist Muslim state (thus probably determin­ing Afghanistan’s fate as well), while India might be seized by fanatical Hindu passions. Irrationality might then overwhelm the strategic restraint inherent in the nuclear calculus. Just as the West for years has been relatively indifferent to the unresolved Palestinian issue, so it has also neglected Kashmir. India has been able to insist formally that there is no Kashmir issue, either between India and Pakistan or for the international community as a whole—that it is an internal matter. Pakistan in turn has relied on thinly camouflaged official support for guerrilla and terrorist actions against India’s control of the province as a way of keeping the issue alive—thereby also precipitating increasingly heavy-handed Indian repression of Kashmiris suspected of disloyalty. Once both countries acquired nuclear weapons, the Kashmir issue inevitably gained wider international significance. The question of Kashmir has now become part of the larger problem of instability in the Global Balkans. Its peaceful resolution is likely to he at least as difficult as that of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The conflict involves two major states that jointly have a population approaching 1.2 billion people—roughly one-fifth of the world—and much of that population is still pre-modern, semiliterate, and suscep­tible (even among the elites) to demagogic appeals. Fostering a compromise in that setting will require sustained outside engagement, considerable international pressure, major political and financial inducements, and a great deal of patience. Here again, political solidarity between the United States and the European Union, perhaps tangibly backed by Japan, would make even­tual success more likely. Great Britain, for historical reasons, can play an important diplomatic role, especially in concert with the United States. Both Russia and China may be supportive, since neither would benefit from a nuclear war in its immediate proximity, and each can subtly influence the major purchaser of its arms exports (India in the case of Russia, Pakistan in the case of China). The reality, however, is that a major collective international effort is likely only in the face of an imminent threat of war, with international concern rapidly fading once the threat recedes [P. 76-77]

#### ALSO key to European stability

Kagan ‘7 – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, [http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136](http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.

#### Goes nuclear

Glaser ’93 (Charles L Glaser (Professor of Public Policy at University of Chicago) 1993 International Security, Summer, p. 8-9)

However, although the lack of an imminent Soviet threat eliminates the most obvious danger, U.S. security has not been entirely separated from the future of Western Europe. The ending of the Cold War has brought many benefits, but has not eliminated the possibility of major power war, especially since such a war could grow out of a smaller conflict in the East. And, although nuclear weapons have greatly reduced the threat that a European hegemon would pose to U.S. security, a sound case nevertheless remains that a European war could threaten U.S. security. The United States couldbe drawn into such a war, even if strict security considerations suggested it should stay out. A major power war could escalate to a nuclear war that, especially if the United States joins, could include attacks against the American homeland. Thus, the United States should not be unconcerned about Europe’s future.

### 2AC – CP

#### Perm Do both

#### Waiver Cplan won’t solve US-Cuban relations – signal still matters.

White ‘10

(Jonathan P. White; J.D. 2010, University of Colorado Law School. Mr. White thanks Daniel Whittle, Cuba Program Director, Environmental Defense Fund; Dr. Orlando Rey Santos, Lawyer and Director of the Environmental Directorate, Ministry of Science, Technology, and the Environment (CITMA), Havana, Cuba; and Richard Charter, Senior Policy Advisor, Defenders of Wildlife, for their guidance and input in preparation of this note. Summer, 2010 – Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy – 21 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 557 – lexis)

Drilling off the coast of Cuba necessarily raises political issues surrounding the tumultuous relationship between the communist nation and its neighbor across the Straits. The United States has maintained its trade embargo on Cuba since the 1960s. n195 A travel ban parallels the [\*587] trade embargo. n196 The 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act, formally placed Cuban economic and travel restrictions into the U.S. Code. n197 This law urged the U.S. president to impose sanctions on nations that provide assistance to Cuba. n198 Though this provision, one that chafed U.S. allies, has gone unenforced, the law sets the tone for the acrid relationship between the nations. n199 To this day, the complicated relationship between Cuba and the United States languishes. n200

#### Perm do the plan but have the Treasury implement it

#### And their evidence goes aff—their Stephens evidence indicates that we need to have pro-active steps to prevent spills from killing biodiversity—the aff is key

#### MEXUS arrangements can’t solve – embargo blocks info sharing

Hatcher ‘10

Monica Hatcher, Energy Reporter for the Houston Chronicle, “Cuba Drilling Poses Spill Issue: Group Says Trade¶ Embargo Could Hinder a Response by the U.S.”, Houston Chronicle; Sept. 6, 2010 – www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Group-warns-Cuba-trade-embargo-could-hurt-a-spill-1695883.php

The trade embargo against Cuba could undermine efforts to prevent or respond to an oil spill threatening the U.S. coast after Cuba launches a drilling program in the Straits of Florida next year, a Houston-based industry group is warning.¶ Representatives of the International Association of Drilling Contractors late last month made the first visit of a U.S. oil delegation to the communist island nation in nearly 50 years. The group from Houston met with Cuban officials to discuss safety protocols and to learn more about the country's plan to drill seven exploratory wells in the Gulf of Mexico, some within 50 miles of Key West, Fla.¶ In U.S. waters, drilling is prohibited within 100 miles of Florida's Gulf Coast.¶ Lee Hunt, the group's chief executive, said Cubans are eager to work with U.S. industry to ensure safer drilling. But the embargo forbids sharing certain information and material that would be needed to respond quickly to an accident, such as relief well technology or nearby U.S.-made or U.S.-owned equipment.

#### And they can’t solve the economy—domestic drilling is too expensive to bring back any economic benefits

#### Even revised licenses can’t solve – Aff is necessary.

Stephens ‘11

et al, Sarah Stephens – Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas – “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest,” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba\_Drilling\_and\_US\_Policy.pdf

Existing policy is inadequate and responses would come too late.¶ Administration officials have said that they would provide piecemeal responses¶ to a spill under existing licensing authority. As the¶ Houston Chronicle¶ reported,¶ for example, “In July, the Obama administration signaled its intent to grant¶ licenses to specific companies providing services related to ‘oil spill prevention¶ and containment support.’”¶ 65¶ In a written response to a question submitted by a reporter to the State¶ Department, Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, said,¶ “U.S. oil spill mitigation service companies can be licensed through the¶ Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to provide¶ oil spill prevention and containment support to companies operating in¶ Cuba. We will continue to pursue these and other initiatives within our¶ authority in order to minimize risk to U.S. waters and shores.”¶ 66¶ Later, the¶ New York Times¶ quoted Charles Luoma-Overstreet, a State¶ Department spokesman, saying licenses allowing U.S. firms to respond to¶ an oil spill would be granted on an “application-by-application basis,” but¶ said that he would not comment on the criteria.¶ 67¶ But, as an industry insider told CDA, “Do not let this statement fool you...¶ we need legislation and or an executive order allowing all petroleum services and¶ equipment companies to do business in Cuba. How are we are going to know at¶ the time of an accident in Cuban waters what piece of equipment is going to be¶ needed from what company? In case of an accident, we do not have the luxury to¶ apply for a license for a specific product and or service from a specific company.

#### Perm do the counterplan

#### Domestic drilling doesn’t solve Russia—the plan is key to relations

Benjamin-Alvarado ‘10

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication – obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 121

The United States possesses few options when it comes to balancing the various risks to U.S. energy security and satisfying energy demand, because U.S. energy independence is not attainable, the policy tools available to deal with energy supply disruptions are increasingly inadequate, and the United States needs to articulate a new vision of how best to manage international energy interdependence. In particular, even if the United States were to choose to exploit all of its domestic energy resources, it would remain dependent on oil imports to meet its existing and future demand. The critical need to improve the integrity of the U.S. energy supply requires a much broader, more flexible view on the quest for resources— a view that does not shun a source from a potential strategic partner for purely political reasons. U.S. decisionmakers must look dispassionately at potential energy partners in terms of the role they might play in meeting political, economic, and geostrategic objectives of U.S. energy security. The Obama administration has signaled that it wants to reinvigorate inter-American cooperation and integration; a movement toward energy cooperation and development with Cuba is consistent with, and may be central to, that objective.

### 2AC – Politics

#### Not a chance of passage in the house – Obama made a severe political miscalculation

Noah Rothman, Columnist, 9/5 [“Will Democrats Forgive Obama for Blowing His Second Term?” http://www.mediaite.com/online/will-democrats-forgive-obama-for-blowing-his-second-term/]

When the president was finally moved to respond to his own “red line” in Syria, three months after his own administration had confirmed that it was first violated, Obama shed what may come to be seen as his last bit of political capital. The president’s schizophrenic approach to pushing for intervention in Syria was capped off by his decision (and his alone, if you believe the anonymous disclosures) to seek Congressional authorization for a strike. This was a politically deft maneuver. ¶ The proposed action in Syria being as unpopular as it is, Obama would have been partially shielded from criticism if the decision to act was born out of a national consensus. Just getting a few officeholders, Republican and Democrat alike, on the record in support of intervention will provide some political cover for the president.¶ But the White House’s spectacular failure to achieve support appears to be backfiring. Not only does the House look set to vote down an authorization, it is not even a close call. As of this writing, 51 Democrats and 149 Republicans are set to vote against authorizing force in Syria.¶ This lack of confidence in the president’s proposal has now cast doubt on whether the Democrat-dominated Senate will follow the House’s lead. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) announced Wednesday that authorization of force would require 60 votes — a near impossibility in the current climate.

#### Striking Syria can’t stop chemical warfare or stop Iranian nuclearization

Robert Reich, Chancellor's Professor of Public Policy, University of California at Berkeley, 9/5 [“Obama's Political Capital and the Slippery Slope of Syria,” Huff post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/obamas-political-capital-\_1\_b\_3874241.html]

It would be one thing if a strike on Syria was critical to America's future, or even the future of the Middle East. But it is not. In fact, a strike on Syria may well cause more havoc in that tinder-box region of the world by unleashing still more hatred for America, the West, and for Israel, and more recruits to terrorism. Strikes are never surgical; civilians are inevitably killed. Moreover, the anti-Assad forces have shown themselves to be every bit as ruthless as Assad, with closer ties to terrorist networks.¶ Using chemical weapons against one's own innocent civilians is a crime against humanity, to be sure, but the United States cannot be the world's only policeman. The UN Security Council won't support us, we can't muster NATO, Great Britain and Germany will not join us. Dictatorial regimes are doing horrendous things to their people in many places around the world. It would be folly for us to believe we could stop it all**.¶** Obama and his secretary of state, John Kerry, are now arguing that a failure to act against Syria will embolden enemies of Israel like Iran and Hezbollah, and send a signal to Iran that the United States would tolerate the fielding of a nuclear device. This is almost the same sort of specious argument -- America's credibility at stake, and if we don't act we embolden our enemies and the enemies of our allies -- used by George W. Bush to justify toppling Saddam Hussein, and, decades before that, by Lyndon Johnson to justify a tragic war in Vietnam.¶ It has proven to be a slippery slope: Once we take military action, any subsequent failure to follow up or prevent gains by the other side is seen as an even larger sign of our weakness, further emboldening our enemies.¶

#### Strikes result in volatile oil shocks – tanks the global economy

Bloomberg 9/5 [Stepan Kravchenko, Henry Meyer & Anatoly Temkin, St. Petersburg Staff, “G-20 Wrangles Over Stimulus Exit as Syria Roils Markets,” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-05/g-20-wrangles-over-stimulus-exit-as-syria-roils-markets.html]

Obama, who has asked Congress to endorse a punitive strike on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces after an alleged chemical attack on civilians, is trying to enlist international support at the G-20 meeting. Italy and Germany have joined Russia and China in insisting they won’t support military intervention without United Nations Security Council approval.¶ ‘Need Stability’¶ Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta said any such operation would cause volatility on financial markets. “We don’t need volatility, we need stability,” he said. “We are concerned about it.”¶ Brent may rise to $120-$125 a barrel if the U.S. and allies begin military action in Syria and may “spike briefly” to $150 if a U.S.-led attack on Syria sparks further conflict in the Middle East and supply disruptions, Michael Wittner, Societe Generale SA (GLE)’s New York-based head of oil market research, said in a report on Aug. 30.¶ “The concern for everyone is that a rise in oil prices would pose a risk to economic recovery,” Capital Economics Ltd. economist Julian Jessop, said by phone from London yesterday. “It remains to be seen if the current rate of growth will continue if oil prices stay at today’s levels or even rise.”¶ BRICS nations discussed the risk posed by a Syrian strike on the sidelines of the G-20 summit, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said. They agreed that it would lead to an “extraordinary negative influence on the economy,” he said.¶ Oil Price¶ Capital Economics’ Jessop calculates that in the worst-case scenario, a jump to $150 a barrel, would threaten “stagnation” by knocking 1 percentage point off international expansion.¶ China’s Zhu said his country is in consultations with the IMF on the fallout from Syria and cited the Washington-based lender’s forecasts that a $10 per barrel increase in oil would wipe a quarter percentage point off global growth.

#### No link—the plan doesn’t require congressional approval

Snow 12 (Nick Snow, OGJ Washington Editor, “Cuba drilling continues as US groups press spill response need”, 5/11/12, http://www.ogj.com/articles/2012/05/cuba-drilling-continues-as-us-groups-press-spill-response-need.html, zs)

“Historically, it’s been appropriate to talk about Cuba only after the next election,” Reilly observed, adding that the White House was not happy when he led a delegation to that country after the presidential commission on the Macondo well spill completed its investigation. US President Barack Obama does not need congressional approval to modify sanctions against Cuba so US companies could respond if there was a spill, he said.

#### Oil lobby prevents the plan from sapping capital

Sadowski 11 (Richard Sadowski 11, J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, Fall 2011, “In This Issue: Natural Resource Conflict: Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation And Prevention Within The Framework Of The United States' Embargo,”)

A U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba's offshore oil fields hold at least four and a half billion barrels of recoverable oil and ten trillion cubic feet of natural gas. n29 Cupet, the state-owned Cuban energy company, insists that actual reserves are double that of the U.S. estimate. n30 One estimate indicates that Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil per day. n31 Given this vast resource, Cuba has already leased offshore oil exploration blocks to operators from Spain, Norway, and India. n32 Offshore oil discoveries in Cuba are placing increasing pressure for the United States to end the embargo. First, U.S. energy companies are eager to compete for access to Cuban oil reserves. n33 [\*38] Secondly, fears of a Cuban oil spill are argued to warrant U.S. investment and technology. n34 Finally, the concern over Cuban offshore drilling renews cries that the embargo is largely a failure and harms human rights.¶ ECONOMICS: U.S. COMPANIES WANT IN¶ For U.S. companies, the embargo creates concern that they will lose out on an opportunity to develop a nearby resource. n35 Oil companies have a long history of utilizing political pressure for self-serving purposes. n36 American politicians, ever fearful of high energy costs, are especially susceptible to oil-lobby pressures. n37 This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when then-Vice President Dick Cheney told the board of directors of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that "oil is being drilled right now sixty miles off the coast of Florida. But we're not doing it, the Chinese are,

in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out that a good answer to high prices is more supply" n38¶ This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is exacerbated by America's expected increase in consumption rates. n39 Oil company stocks are valued in large part on access to reserves. n40 Thus, more leases, including those in Cuban waters, equal higher stock valuation. n41 "The last thing that American energy companies want is to be trapped on the sidelines by sanctions while European, Canadian and Latin American rivals are free to develop new oil resources on the doorstep of the United States." n42

#### Disads not intrinsic—a logical policy maker could do both—not an opportunity cost

#### Disad is triggered either way – the 1AC is the introduction of the bill into the debate – backlash should have already been triggered

#### PC is an empty concept—no empirical basis

Edwards 9 (Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University, holds the George and Julia Blucher Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies and has served as the Olin Professor of American Government at Oxford George, “The Strategic President”, Printed by the Princeton University Press, pg. 149-150)

Even presidents who appeared to dominate Congress were actually facilitators rather than directors of change. They understood their own limitations and explicitly took advantage of opportunities in their environments. Working at the margins, they successfully guided legislation through Congress. When their resources diminished, they reverted to the stalemate that usually characterizes presidential-congressional relations. As legendary management expert Peter Drucker put it about Ronald Reagan, "His great strength was not charisma, as is commonly thought, but his awareness and acceptance of exactly what he could and what he could not do."134 These conclusions are consistent with systematic research by Jon Bond, Richard Fleisher, and B. Dan Wood. They have focused on determining whether the presidents to whom we attribute the greatest skills in dealing with Congress were more successful in obtaining legislative support for their policies than were other presidents. After carefully controlling for other influences on congressional voting, they found no evidence that those presidents who supposedly were the most proficient in persuading Congress were more successful than chief executives with less aptitude at influencing legislators.135 Scholars studying leadership within Congress have reached similar conclusions about the limits on personal leadership. Cooper and Brady found that institutional context is more important than personal leadership skills or traits in determining the influence of leaders and that there is no relationship between leadership style and effectiveness.136 Presidential legislative leadership operates in an environment largely beyond the president's control and must compete with other, more stable factors that affect voting in Congress in addition to party. These include ideology, personal views and commitments on specific policies, and the interests of constituencies. By the time a president tries to exercise influence on a vote, most members of Congress have made up their minds on the basis of these other factors. Thus, a president's legislative leadership is likely to be critical only for those members of Congress who remain open to conversion after other influences have had their impact. Although the size and composition of this group varies from issue to issue, it will almost always be a minority in each chamber.

#### Plan doesn’t sap capital—but it doesn’t regenerate it

Moise 06 (Hilary, Research associate for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “U.S. Embargo against Cuba under Growing Siege,” http://www.coha.org/cuba-embargo-under-growing-siege/)

The reportedly steadfast intention of the president to veto any legislation containing language weakening the embargo against Cuba may prove no match for the allure of oil riches; much like the environmental integrity of the Alaskan wilderness, the ideological hegemony behind the Cuba embargo may be sacrificed to feed America’s oil hunger. History has shown that human-rights records and democratic failings have not in any way prevented favorable economic relations—the U.S. buys oil from Saudi Arabia and Russia—and Cuba’s substantial oil reserves may be the perfect carrot to entice the U.S. government away from its automatic condemnation of the Cuban government’s actions.

#### Cuba engagement is key to Obama’s credibility

Dickerson 10 (Lieutenant Colonel Sergio M. "United States Security Strategy Towards Cuba," Strategy Research Project, [www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053))

**Conclusion**¶ Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. If the Cuban model succeeds PresidentObama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism. Success in Cuba could afford **the** international momentum and credibility to solve other seemingly “wicked problems”

like the Middle East and Kashmir. President Obama could leverage this international reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea whomight associate their plight with Cuba. 35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and reverse its perceived decline in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to come.

#### Obama weakness causes global conflict

Coes 11 (a former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration) September 30 “The disease of a weak president”, The Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/)

Off case The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles’ heel all politicians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike.¶ In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn’t bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces.¶ But Obama’s weakness could — in other places — have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons.¶ If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one. Here are a few unsettling facts to think about:¶ First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over.¶ Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device.¶ Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets India’s natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little notice from the outside world.¶ In my book, Coup D’Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d’état.¶ I wish it was that simple. The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India.¶ There are many threats out there — Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president. It doesn’t have to be this way. President Obama could — if he chose — develop a backbone and lead. Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The status quo is simply not an option.

### 2AC – CP

#### Pics bad and a voting issue—

#### Oil key

Spills

#### Interp: 1 Condo

#### Condo is a voting issue – fairness – 2AC can’t make best arguments – Education – hurts depth of discussion and discourages research – Advocacy – only goes for least covered position

#### US-Saudi ties unbreakable – oil not key.

Smith ‘13

James B. Smith is the United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Prior to his appointment, Ambassador Smith had served in a variety of executive positions with Raytheon Company involving corporate strategic planning, aircraft manufacturing, and international business development. Smith was a distinguished graduate of the United States Air Force Academy’s Class of 1974 and received the Richard I. Bong award as the Outstanding Cadet in Military History. He received his Masters in History from Indiana University in 1975, and is also a distinguished graduate from the Naval War College, the Air Command and Staff College and the National War College. Smith spent a 28 year career in the United States Air Force – “US-Saudi relations: Eighty years as partners” – Arab News – 20 March 2013 – http://www.arabnews.com/news/445436

FOR over 80 years the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have enjoyed a strong relationship based on mutual respect and common interests. Diplomatic relations were established in 1933. That same year Standard Oil of California signed an oil concession agreement with Saudi Arabia. That initial partnership, of course, developed into the largest oil company in the world in terms of crude oil production and exports; Saudi Aramco.¶ As Secretary Kerry’s recent visit shows, our close relationship continues to today. The United States and Saudi Arabia share a common concern for regional security and stabilizing the global oil markets. We also share a charitable impulse to aid the less fortunate, as our foreign assistance efforts, both public and private, demonstrate. Two key pillars of our relationship are economics and commerce. Trade, investment, education, and tourism all help deepen the relationship between our two countries, because they are not just about government to government relationships, but about people to people relationships.¶ The US-Saudi trade relationship has grown considerably over the past few years with our total two-way trade last year reaching almost $ 74 billion. In President Obama’s 2010 State of the Union address, he set an ambitious goal of doubling US exports from their level in 2009. We are well on our way toward achieving that goal with Saudi Arabia, with the value of US non-defense exports to Saudi Arabia increasing by almost 68 percent. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, Saudi exports to the United States have more than doubled during the same period. Our services trade also continues to expand. In 2010, the most recent year for which statistics are available, the US exported over $ 5 billion in education, business, and professional consulting services to Saudi Arabia.¶ As might be expected, oil remains an important part of our bilateral economic relationship. With Saudi Arabia exporting between a million and a million and a half barrels per day to the United States, it is by far Saudi’s largest export to our country; just as our largest non-defense export to Saudi Arabia remains motor vehicles. However, our relationship has developed far beyond oil and automobiles. Saudi Arabia is an important market for US aircraft, chemicals, machinery, agriculture, and computer products. In addition to oil, some of our largest imports from Saudi Arabia include chemicals, metals and textiles. Another measure of how much our bilateral trade relationship is growing is the number of new US exporters to Saudi Arabia. Last year over 150 companies entered the Saudi market for the first time.

#### Saudi Arabia will *never* prolif.

Lippman ‘8

[Thomas W. Lippman is a former Middle East correspondent and a diplomatic and national security reporter for The Washington Post (1966-1999, 2003). He covered the war in Iraq for The Washington Post’s online edition in 2003. He appears frequently on radio and television as a commentator on Middle Eastern affairs. He is the author of several books about the Middle East and American foreign policy, including Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia (2004), Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy (2000), Egypt After Nasser (1989) and Understanding Islam (1995). He has also written on these subjects for several magazines, including The Middle East Journal, SAIS Review and US News and World Report. His latest book on the history of US engagement in Saudi Arabia and US-Saudi relations will be published in January 2008. Lippman is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, “Nuclear Weapons and Saudi Strategy” The Middle East Institute, http://www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Publications/nuclear-weapons-saudi-strategy.pdf]

It is widely believed among policymakers and strategic analysts in Washington and in many Middle Eastern capitals that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will feel compelled to do the same. In some ways this belief makes sense because Saudi Arabia is as vulnerable as it is rich, and it has long felt threatened by the revolutionary ascendancy of its Shi‘ite rival across the Gulf. Moreover, some senior Saudi officials have said privately that their country’s hand would be forced if it became known beyond doubt that Iran had become nuclear weapons capable. The publication in late 2007 of portions of a US National Intelligence Estimate reporting that Iran had abandoned a program to weaponize nuclear devices in 2003 did not put an end to the speculation about a Saudi Arabian response; the NIE made clear that Iran was continuing its effort to master the uranium enrichment process, and could resume a weapons program on short notice. It is far from certain, however, that Saudi Arabia would wish to acquire its own nuclear arsenal or that it is capable of doing so. There are compelling reasons why Saudi Arabia would not undertake an effort to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, even in the unlikely event that Iran achieves a stockpile and uses this arsenal to threaten the Kingdom. Money is not an issue — if destitute North Korea can develop nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia surely has the resources to pursue such a program. In the fall of 2007, the Saudis reported a budget surplus of $77 billion, and with oil prices above $90 a barrel, Riyadh is flush with cash. But the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons would be provocative, destabilizing, controversial and extremely difficult for Saudi Arabia, and ultimately would likely weaken the kingdom rather than strengthen it. Such a course would be directly contrary to the Kingdom’s longstanding stated goal of making the entire Middle East a nuclear weapons free zone. According to Sultan bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, the Defense Minister and Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, nuclear weapons by their nature contravene the tenets of Islam. Pursuing nuclear weapons would be a flagrant violation of Saudi Arabia’s commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and would surely cause a serious breach with the United States. Saudi Arabia lacks the industrial and technological base to develop such weapons on its own. An attempt to acquire nuclear weapons by purchasing them, perhaps from Pakistan, would launch Saudi Arabia on a dangerously inflammatory trajectory that could destabilize the entire region, which Saudi Arabia’s leaders know would not be in their country’s best interests. The Saudis always prefer stability to turmoil.

#### Mid-East war especially unlikely

Fettweis ‘7

(Christopher Fettweis, Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” Survival, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98)

Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni-Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely.¶Wider war¶ No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam's rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again.¶ The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique.¶ The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co-religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17¶ Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare.

#### Non-unique Iran prolif coming – makes Saudi prolif inevitable.

Samay Live ‘13

(Samay Live a leading Hindi news portal – this report is internally quoting The Institute for Science and International Security – This same article is released on Agence France Presse and is basically an international wire release. January 15, 2013 – lexis)

Iran is on track to produce material for at least one nuclear bomb by mid-2014 as sanctions hit its economy but fail to stop the atomic program, said a US think tank, further adding that Islamic republic could reach 'critical capability' within this time frame without detection by the West.¶ The Institute for Science and International Security, a private group opposed to nuclear proliferation, called for tougher US economic sanctions against Iran and pressure on major trading partners to isolate Tehran yesterday.¶ The group looked at Iran's "critical capability,"defined as the point at which the clerical regime will be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium or separated plutonium to build one or more bombs before foreign detection.¶ "Based on the current trajectory of Iran's nuclear program, we estimate that Iran could reach this critical capability in mid-2014," the think tank said in a report.¶ The think tank based its assessment on the growth in Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium and number of centrifuges and what it described as an uncooperative stance by Tehran toward the UN atomic agency.¶ The institute said it was "deeply skeptical" of the potential for preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons and painted a dire picture of the consequences if the regime developed the bomb.¶ The think tank said that a nuclear weapon would "embolden Iranian aggression and subversion" and questioned whether Iran's leadership, with its "apocalyptic messianism and exaltation of martyrdom," could be deterred from using a bomb.¶ The report also said that an Iranian nuclear arsenal could motivate Saudi Arabia to develop a nuclear program,fueling proliferation in a region where Israel is the sole,albeit undeclared, state with nuclear weapons. The United States has championed sanctions aimed at crippling the Iranian economy by cutting off its oil exports,while Israel has not ruled out the possibility of a military strike on Iran.

#### No link and No Aff double-bind. Cuban oil can be sufficient to avoid extreme US energy insecurities without making the Saudis think they’ve lost the US market. The US consumes a lot of oil

#### No link – Saudis not concerned about North American oil boom.

AFP ‘13

[Agence France Presse – “US energy independence idea ‘naive’: Nuaimi,” 05.01.2013, http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/gcc-business/235108-us-energy-independence-idea-%E2%80%98naive%E2%80%99-nuaimi.html]

WASHINGTON: Saudi Oil Minister Ali bin Ibrahim Al Nuaimi yesterday called the US push for energy independence “naive,” saying the country will continue to need Middle Eastern oil long into the future.¶ Ali bin Ibrahim said he welcomed the surge in US domestic energy production from shale oil and gas fields, which he said will add depth and stability to global oil markets.¶ “Newly commercial reserves of shale or tight oil are transforming the energy industry in America — and that’s great news,” he told an audience of policy makers and academics at the Center for Strategic & International Studies in Washington. “It is helping to sustain the US economy and create jobs at a difficult time. I welcome these new supplies into the global oil market.” he added.¶ On the other hand, he said, it was not realistic to believe this would help the United States eliminate imports of oil, a goal of some Americans who argue energy independence is crucial for the country’s security.¶ Despite the domestic production gains, US imports of Middle East oil in the second half of 2012 were higher than any time since the 1990s, Ali bin Ibrahim said. The United States “will continue to meet domestic demand by utilising a range of different sources, including from the Middle East. This is simply sound economics. I believe this talk of ending reliance is a naive, rather simplistic view.” ¶ Ali bin Ibrahim, meanwhile, emphasised that Saudi Arabia remains able to sustain its reserves at the current 266 billion barrels and said that could increase, especially if technology for extracting “tight” shale oil and gas improves.¶ But he contradicted comments by another top Saudi official, former intelligence chief Prince Turki Al Faisal, on Saudi oil development plans.¶ In a speech on Monday at Harvard University, Turki said Saudi Arabia would increase production capacity to 15 million barrels a day from the current 12.5m b/d. “Saudi Arabia’s national production management scheme is set to increase total capacity to 15 million barrels per day and have an export potential of 10 barrels per day by 2020,” Turki said.¶ Ali bin Ibrahim suggested Turki misspoke. “We have no plans” for that, Naimi said. “We don’t really see a need to build a capacity beyond what we have today.”¶ Experts say Asia and Iran are the keys to maintaining a strong - but evolving - US-Saudi Arabia energy relationship. As the United States produces oil at the highest levels in 20 years thanks to the shale boom, Saudi Arabia’s confidence in Asian markets could help keep relations between the two countries on track**.**¶ “The Saudis don’t see the North American oil boom as a threat, not in the context of the global oil market,” said a Washington-based energy consultant to governments and businesses. Ali bin Ibrahim said in a speech early this month in Doha that nobody should fear new oil supplies when global demand is rising, adding that Asia’s population growth should be a driver for future oil demand. ¶ Saudi Arabia, the main source of global spare oil production capacity, will be one of the few places with the ability to supply China and other Asian countries. In contrast, extra barrels from North Dakota and Texas will be consumed in the United States, at least until laws are changed to allow the country’s producers to export substantial amounts of crude. ¶ The relationship between Riyadh and Washington may be changing but the two countries still share important goals on balancing oil markets going forward. One is to keep oil prices from going too high in order to keep Iran from in check.¶ The United States is trying to choke funds to Tehran’s disputed nuclear programme through the application of sanctions on its oil sales. High global crude prices could hurt that effort. Saudi Arabia also does not want Iran to get nuclear weapons and is expected to keep oil prices stable**.**¶ “We are still partners but less intimate partners than we once were,” said Chas Freeman, who served as US ambassador to Saudi Arabia under former president George H W Bush.¶ For decades Saudi Arabia and the United States had a special relationship: the kingdom provided the United States oil, and the United States provided Saudi Arabia protection against enemies. As Saudi Arabia becomes less of an important supplier to the United States, the world’s biggest oil consumer, some see that special relationship declining.¶ Even as Saudi looks to other markets, it still is the second largest oil exporter to the United States after Canada, with shipments averaging 1.4 million barrels per day in the first 10 months of last year

#### If there is a link, then growing US domestic production should also cause it

Fox News ‘13

[Fox News, 3/8/13, “¶ 'Secret energy revolution' could hasten end to dependence on foreign oil,” http://www.foxnews.com/science/2013/03/08/secret-energy-revolution-could-hasten-end-to-dependence-on-foreign-oil/#ixzz2W406KHfi]

A wealth of new technologies -- from underwater robots to 3-D scanners to nano-engineered lubricants -- are transforming the energy exploration industry in ways that will hasten the end of America’s reliance on Middle East oil.¶ ¶ That’s the take on America’s “secret energy revolution,” according to a report in the Washington Guardian. And the proof is in the balance sheets: According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, monthly imports of oil peaked in Sept. 2006 at 12.7 million barrels per day and has declined 40 percent since then, to 7.6 million barrels in Nov. 2012.¶ ¶ That’s partly due to falling demand, as the U.S. economy contracted and drivers with smaller wallets balked at the high price of gas. Cars became more fuel efficient as well, often powered by batteries rather than gas. But it’s also largely due to the increased production of oil on U.S. shores, the IISS said.¶ ¶ “Rising production of liquid fuels in the United States accounts for 60 percent of the fall in U.S. oil imports since 2006 and nearly 100 percent since 2010,” the group reported. If the trend continues, the U.S. could become oil independent in the coming years, they added.¶ ¶ What’s led to such a surge? An assortment of new technologies and innovative means to tap the oil trapped in shale rock formations, helping sip every last drop from deep wells beneath U.S. soil. ¶ ¶ “Nanoengineered materials, underwater robots, side-scanning 3-D sonar, specially engineered lubricants, and myriad other advances are opening up titanic new supplies of fossil fuels, many of them in unexpected places … perhaps most significantly, North America,” wrote Vince Beiser in Pacific Standard.¶ ¶ The problem for domestic oil has never been a lack of supply, surprisingly. It’s been the inability to tap into that oil, Beiser noted. Fracking is the most high-profile means of doing so, a method for pumping pressurized, specially treated mud into the dense shale formations that trap oil and gas. Fracking has brought with it real environmental concerns, however, including charges that it increases the risk of earthquakes and pollutes ground water.¶ ¶ But there’s no doubt the process succeeds in getting fuel out of the ground. “Fracking is about as popular with the general public as puppy kicking, but it’s very big business,” Beiser wrote. American shale gas production totaled 320 billion cubic feet in 2000; in 2011, the number was 7.8 trillion.¶ ¶ That’s by no means the only innovation.¶ ¶ To hit some of the deepest ocean wells, Houston’s FMC Technologies wants to move oil production to the bottom of the ocean, with special undersea robots built to survive the incredible pressure at those depths.¶ ¶ “We are not far from this vision. Maybe 15 years,” Paulo Couto, a vice president of technology for FMC, told Pacific Standard. Other companies are using chemistry to tweak the mud shot down pipes into the ground to lubricate the path for drills, and using new means to detect the pockets of oil that do lie nearby.¶ ¶ “The dynamics of abundant fuel supplies will be a catalyst for major geo-political shifts,” the Washington Guardian wrote.

#### Lifting oil restrictions checks a forthcoming wave of Cuban LNG imports

Benjamin-Alvarado 10 (Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication – obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 111-12)

The authors of chapter 2, Jorge R. Piñón and Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, find that there are a number of key issues to consider regarding the productive capacity of Cuba’s oil and gas resources. First, Cuba has seen close to $2 billion of direct foreign investment since 1991 in its upstream oil and natural gas sector, with very good results. Crude oil liquids production reached a peak level of 65,531 barrels per day in 2003, up from 9,090 barrels per day in 1991. Since 2005 Cuba has seen its crude oil production level off at around 52,000 barrels per day. Second, Cuba’s realized crude oil value could improve substantially once the country is able to monetize its heavy oil production by means of its own future heavy oil conversion refinery processing capacity, or to market its crude oil to U.S. Gulf Coast refining companies. Third, Cuba’s onshore and coastal heavy oil production seems to have reached a plateau at around 52,000 barrels per day, but once Cupet has access to the services, technology, equipment, and capital available through independent U.S. oil and oil services and equipment companies (when the trade embargo is lifted or modified), Cuba’s heavy oil production potential could grow to an amount in excess of 75,000 barrels a day. Deficiencies in Cuba’s oil-refining sector— including outdated technology that is unable to process heavy crude— coupled with an environmentally sensitive tourist industry will force Cuba to consider developing an energy policy that relies heavily on clean-burning natural gas as its fuel of choice for power generation. Cuba’s future natural gas needs could be sourced as liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Trinidad and Tobago, as Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic currently do, or from future Venezuelan production. A regasification facility to receive Venezuela-sourced liquid natural gas is being planned for the southern coast port city of Cienfuegos by Venezuela’s PDVSA and Cupet. Two one-million-ton regasification trains are planned for 2012 at a cost of over $400 million. The natural gas is destined as fuel for that city’s thermoelectric power plant, local industry, and future petrochemical plants.

#### Increasing LNG imports causes accidents—outweighs everything

Lovins 1 (analysts, lectures and consultants on energy, resource and security policy, Hunter Lovins has degrees in Law, , and consulted Brittle Power : Energy Strategy for National Security – Rocky Mountain Institute --  [http://www.rmi.org/images/other/S-BrPwr-Parts123.pdf](http://www.rmi.org/images/other/S-BrPwr-Parts123.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

Disasters Waiting to Happen :  Liquified Natural Gas  Natural gas can be sent by pipeline over long distances. For a price, it can be piped from North Sea platforms to the British mainland, from Algeria to Italy, or from Siberia to Western Europe. But pipelines are not a feasible way to send gas across major oceans—for example, from the Mideast or Indonesia to the United States. A high-technology way to transport natural gas overseas has, however, been developed in the past few decades, using the techniques of cryogenics—the science of extremely low temperatures.  In this method, a sort of giant refrigerator, costing more than a billion dollars, chills a vast amount of gas until it condenses into a colorless, odorless liquid at a temperature of two hundred sixty degrees Fahrenheit below zero. This liquefied natural gas (LNG) has a volume six hundred twenty times smaller than the original gas. The intensely cold LNG is then transported at approximately atmospheric pressure in special, heavily insulated cryogenic tankers—the costliest non-military seagoing vessels in the world—to a marine terminal, where it is stored in insulated tanks. When needed, it can then be piped to an adjacent gasification plant—nearly as complex and costly as the liquefaction plant—where it is boiled back into gas and distributed to customers by pipeline just like wellhead gas.  Approximately sixty smaller plants in North America also liquefy and store domestic natural gas as a convenient way of increasing their storage capacity for winter peak demands which could otherwise exceed the capacity of trunk pipeline supplying the area. This type of local storage to augment peak supplies is called "peak-shaving." Such plants can be sited anywhere gas is available in bulk; they need have nothing to do with marine LNG tankers.  LNG is less than half as dense as water, so a cubic meter of LNG (the usual unit of measure) weighs just over half a ton.1 LNG contains about thirty percent less energy per cubic meter than oil, but is potentially far more hazardous.2 Burning oil cannot spread very far on land or water, but a cubic meter of spilled LNG rapidly boils into about six hundred twenty cubic meters of pure natural gas, which in turn mixes with surrounding air. Mixtures of between about five and fourteen percent natural gas in air are flammable. Thus a single cubic meter of spilled LNG can make up to twelve thousand four hundred cubic meters of flammable gas-air mixture. A single modern LNG tanker typically holds one hundred twenty-five thousand cubic meters of LNG, equivalent to twenty-seven hundred million cubic feet of natural gas. That gas can form between about twenty and fifty billion cubic feet of flammable gas-air mixture—several hundred times the volume of the Great Pyramid of Cheops.  About nine percent of such a tankerload of LNG will probably, if spilled onto water, boil to gas in about five minutes.3 (It does not matter how cold the water is; it will be at least two hundred twenty-eight Fahrenheit degrees hotter than the LNG, which it will therefore cause to boil violently.) The resulting gas, however, will be so cold that it will still be denser than air. It will therefore flow in a cloud or plume along the surface until it reaches an ignition source. Such a plume might extend at least three miles downwind from a large tanker spill within ten to twenty minutes.4 It might ultimately reach much farther—perhaps six to twelve miles.5 If not ignited, the gas is asphyxiating. If ignited, it will burn to completion with a turbulent diffusion flame reminiscent of the 1937 Hindenberg disaster but about a hundred times as big. Such a fireball would burn everything within it, and by its radiant heat would cause third-degree burns and start fires a mile or two away.6 An LNG fireball can blow through a city, creating “a very large number of ignitions and explosions across a wide area. No present or foreseeable equipment can put out a very large [LNG]... fire.”7 The energy content of a single standard LNG tanker (one hundred twenty-five thousand cubic meters) is equivalent to seven-tenths of a megaton of TNT, or about fifty-five Hiroshima bombs.

#### Only say yes to oil

Reuters 10 (Reuters International News Agency, 7/31/10, No article name provided, http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/07/31/cuba-oil-idUKN3019123020100731)

Due to the U.S. trade embargo, U.S. oil companies are not allowed to operate in Cuba. Later this month a group from the Houston-based International Association of Drilling Contractors is scheduled to visit Cuba. The group has said it wants to discuss offshore safety issues with Cuban officials and get an overview of deepwater prospects. Despite five decades of hostile relations, Cuba has said it would welcome the involvement of U.S. companies in developing its offshore fields. Oil expert Jorge Pinon at Florida International University in Miami said U.S. oil service companies would like to enter the Cuban market because it is a new market close to hom

e. "For the U.S. offshore oil industry, Cuba is basically an extension of the Gulf of Mexico. It's not like Angola -- they can provide service from Houston or Freeport or Mobile." (Editing by Todd Eastham)

### 2AC – Pink Tide

#### Cross apply drilling inevitable—that was explained on the spills advantage—means that Castro will get oil profits inevitably—that’s Tamayo

#### Too unique – Pink Tide can’t be revived. Chile, Honduras, and Chavez’s death have all crushed the movement

Paul 13 (not Jonathan Paul – but SUDEEP PAUL, who is an assistant editor with the Opinion Pages of The Indian Express – “Chavez and the oil curse” – Indian Express – March 9th, 2013,

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/chavez-and-the-oil-curse/1085285/#sthash.LquL047o.dpuf)

By 2008, the Pink Tide had overwhelmed nearly half of the 20-odd Latin American countries, excluding permanently red Cuba. El Salvador and Peru were conquered subsequently, in 2009 and 2011 respectively. But by 2010, Chile and Honduras had already left the fold and Brazil's Lula da Silva had made way for his protégé Dilma Rousseff. It was believed by all, except perhaps the starry-eyed hosts of late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in Kolkata and Delhi's JNU, that the Pink Tide was ebbing. One look at the suicidal path taken by Christina Fernandez de Kirchner in Argentina, and you can rest assured that the Bolivarian revolution will end with Chavez.

#### Cuban financial support not key to pink tide – Elites will crush Left-movements unless they’re more extreme

Robinson 11 William I. Robinson a professor of sociology and global studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. “Latin America's left at the crossroads” – 14 Sep 2011 – Aljazeera – http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/09/2011913141540508756.html

The US and the right wing in Latin America have launched a counteroffensive to reverse the turn to the left. The Venezuelan revolution has earned the wrath of Latin American and transnational elites, but Bolivia and Ecuador, and more generally, the region's social movements and leftist political forces are as much targets of this counteroffensive as is Venezuela. In Chile, a right-wing neo-liberal defeated the socialists in last year's elections; in Honduras, the army deposed the progressive government of Manuel Zelaya in a 2009 coup d'etat with the tacit support of Washington; and the US has expanded its military presence throughout the continent, including the installation of new military bases in Colombia, Panama, and Honduras.¶ The Pink Tide governments will not be able to stave off this counteroffensive without mass support. And it may be that the only way to assure that support is by advancing a more fundamentally transformative project.

#### Turn – pink tide at the crossroads. Softening embargo to Cuba boosts the US cause in the region

Tisdall 13 Simon Tisdall is assistant editor and foreign affairs columnist of the Guardian. He was previously foreign editor of the Guardian and the Observer and served as White House correspondent and U.S. editor in Washington D.C. – “Time for U.S. and Cuba to kiss and make up” – CNN – April 8th – http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/08/opinion/opinion-simon-tisdall-cuba

There are other reasons for believing the time is right for Obama to end the Cuba stalemate. The recent death of Hugo Chavez, Venezuela's influential president, has robbed Havana of a strong supporter, both political and financial.¶ Chavez was not interested in a rapprochement with the U.S., either by Cuba or Venezuela. His revolutionary beliefs did not allow for an accommodation with the American "imperialists." His successors may not take so militant a line, especially given that Venezuela continues to trade heavily with the U.S., a privilege not allowed Cuba.¶ The so-called "pink tide" that has brought several left-wing leaders to power in Latin America in the past decade is not exactly on the ebb, but the hostility countries such as Brazil, Ecuador and Bolivia felt towards the Bush administration has abated. In fact, according to Sweig's article, U.S. business with Latin America as a whole is booming, up 20% in 2011. The U.S. imports more crude oil from Venezuela and Mexico than from the Persian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia. The U.S. does three times more business with Latin America than with China.¶ The stand-off over Cuba is an obstacle to advancing U.S. interests and business in Latin American countries, and vice versa. The continuation of the embargo has left the U.S. almost totally isolated at the United Nations, and at sharp odds with its major allies, including Britain and the EU.

#### Pink tide thesis is too sweeping-- Neg impact claims are inaccurate

Nazemroaya ’13 An award-winning author and geopolitical analyst, Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is a Sociologist and Research Associate at the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), a contributor at the Strategic Culture Foundation (SCF), Moscow, and a member of the Scientific Committee of Geopolitica, Italy. “The Pink Tide in Latin America: an Alliance between Local Capital and Socialism ?” – May 03, 2013 – http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/sociopol\_globalelite\_la15.htm

Many questions have arisen about what direction Latin America and the so-called “pink tide” will take since Hugo Chavez’s death and his successor Nicolas Maduro’s victory in the Venezuelan presidential elections against Henrique Capriles Radonski on April 14, 2013. These questions broadly focus on the rest of Latin America and the region’s leftist governments and movements. Several important questions are being asked. Will the US gain ground or lose even more influence in Latin America?¶ Will Latin America continue to move leftwards or will the status quo ante prevail?¶ When looking at this question caution against oversimplification and romanticization is needed.¶ A case in point about this oversimplification and romanticization is that Paraguay’s President Fernando Luga was praised as a steward by the leftists, even though he had to politically work as a centrist. Linked to this, there is also an important question about what right-wing and left-wing really mean.¶ Do governments, groups, and movements that call or consider themselves right-wing or left-wing really fit into such categories?¶ In this context, the terms “left” and “right” need to be operationalized before any discussion can move forward. For purposes of discussion, the “left” would best be operationalized or defined as a political position that advocates reform or, in its radical form, revolution.¶ Its proponents describe it as a position aimed at reducing or ending social inequality whereas its critics view it as either utopian or destabilizing.¶ On the other hand, the “right” would best be operationalized or defined as a conservative and reactionary political position. Its proponents describe it as traditional and a safeguard of stability whereas its critics and opponents say that it supports social hierarchies that maintain societal inequality.¶ Socio-politically, the terms “left” and “right” originate in the upheavals of the French Revolution.¶ The French Estates-General of the Bourbon monarchy and its revolutionary predecessor, the French National Assembly, became divided between those groups that supported the Bourbon monarchy, clergy, and “old regime” and those groups that opposed them in favor of revolution and republicanism.¶ The supporters of the “old regime” would sit to the right of the legislative president or speaker in the legislative chamber whereas those groups that supported change and a “new regime” would sit to the left.¶ It is also important to note that the “right” emerged as a reaction to the formation of the calls for change from the “left.”¶ A Plethora of “Lefts” in Latin America¶ It should be pointed out that contrary to the highly simplistic dualism portrayed by the US government and most leftists about the categorization of Latin America into “left” or “right” is overly simplistic.¶ Things are actually not clear-cut. This means that the above operationalized definitions of “right” and “left” are essentially ideal-types.¶ The leftist governments and movements of Latin America are an eclectic bunch. Thinking of them all in terms of one-size-fits-all is naive and ignores the history and local circumstances/variables that have constructed and influenced each one. In short, each one has its own identity. At least at the grassroots level, they want local agency, relatively more inclusive societies, and a reduction of the influential role of Latin America’s comprador elite oligarchs.¶ Latin America’s comprador elites are the local representatives of the foreign corporations, governments, and interests that have exploited Latin America for centuries.¶ These comprador elites can frankly be described as either the “House Negros” or racist upper class that have historically ruled Latin America and managed its wealth and resources for the changing centers of power in other parts of the world that have controlled the area.¶ Today, the regional comprador elites are mostly aligned with the United States and prefer Miami or New York City to Caracas or Quito. Latin American left-wing governments do not strictly operate to the “left.” There is even a debate over whether the Cuban socialist project is genuinely reforming or if it will eventually follow the paths of capitalist restoration like China and Vietnam. The typology of Latin America described by the sociologist James Petras will help frame this as the most workable way to conceptualize the “left” in Latin America.

And the internal link assumes that Castro will immediately fund the pink tide—Castro is a corrupt leader and will keep the profits to himself

### 1AR

#### Recent setbacks won’t stop drilling. Lifting embargo will minimize the risk.

LaGesse ‘12

David LaGesse¶ reporter, with recent articles that have appeared in National Geographic, Money, and most frequently in U.S. News & World Report – National Geographic News – November 19, 2012 – http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/11/121119-cuba-oil-quest/

An unusual high-tech oil-drilling rig that's been at work off the coast of Cuba departed last week, headed for either Africa or Brazil. With it went the island nation's best hope, at least in the short term, for reaping a share of the energy treasure beneath the sea that separates it from its longtime ideological foe.¶ For many Floridians, especially in the Cuban-American community, it was welcome news this month that Cuba had drilled its third unsuccessful well this year and was suspending deepwater oil exploration. (Related Pictures: "Four Offshore Drilling Frontiers") While some feared an oil spill in the Straits of Florida, some 70 miles (113 kilometers) from the U.S. coast, others were concerned that drilling success would extend the reviled reign of the Castros, long-time dictator Fidel and his brother and hand-picked successor, Raúl.¶ "The regime's latest efforts to bolster their tyrannical rule through oil revenues was unsuccessful," said U.S. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Florida Republican who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in a written statement.¶ But Cuba's disappointing foray into deepwater doesn't end its quest for energy. The nation produces domestically only about half the oil it consumes. As with every aspect of its economy, its choices for making up the shortfall are sorely limited by the 50-year-old United States trade embargo.¶ At what could be a time of transition for Cuba, experts agree that the failure of deepwater exploration increases the Castro regime's dependence on the leftist government of Venezuela, which has been meeting fully half of Cuba's oil needs with steeply subsidized fuel. (Related: "Cuba's New Now") And it means Cuba will continue to seek out a wellspring of energy independence without U.S. technology, greatly increasing both the challenges, and the risks.

## PTX

### PC not key – research found zero correlation between trying to persuade congress and vote counts – ideology, personal views, commitments, constituencies all overwhelm – even if PC has some affect – its applied to late – that’s Edwards – prefer studies

Edwards, 9 – Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University, holds the George and Julia Blucher Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies and has served as the Olin Professor of American Government at Oxford [George, “The Strategic President”, Printed by the Princeton University Press, pg. 9-10]

The tenacity with which many commentators embrace the persuasive potential of political leadership is striking. They routinely explain historic shifts in public policy such as those in the 1930s, 1960s, and 1980s in terms of the extraordinary persuasiveness of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Ronald Reagan. Equally striking is the lack of evidence of the persuasive power of the presidency. Observers in both the press and the academy base their claims about the impact of such leadership on little or no systematic evidence and seemingly little reflection. There is not a single systematic study that demonstrates that presidents can reliably move others to support them. Perhaps faith in the potential of persuasive leadership persists because such a view simplifies political analysis. Because broader forces that may influence changes in policy are complex and perhaps even intractable, focusing primarily on the individual as leader eases the burden of explaining policy change. Faith in the persuasive presidency also simplifies the evaluation of the problems of governing. If it is reasonable to expect the White House to create opportunities for change, then failures of leadership must be personal deficiencies. If problems arise because the leader lacks the proper will, skills, or understanding, then the solution to our need for leadership is straightforward and simple: Elect presidents who are willing and able to lead. Because the system is responsive to appropriate leadership, it will function smoothly with the right leader in the Oval Office. The blame for unsuccessful leadership lies with the leader rather than with the opportunities for change in the leader's environment.

### AND – only empirics

Rockman 9 Bert, prof of poly sci @ Purdue, Presidential Studies Quarterly vol 39 issue 4, October 2009, da: 7-20-2012

 Although Neustadt shunned theory as such, his ideas could be made testable by scholars of a more scientific bent. George Edwards (e.g., 1980, 1989, 1990, 2003) and others (e.g., Bond and Fleisher 1990) have tested Neustadt's ideas about skill and prestige translating into leverage with other actors. In this, Neustadt's ideas turned out to be wrong and insufficiently specified. We know from the work of empirical scientists that public approval (prestige) by itself does little to advance a president's agenda and that the effects of approval are most keenly felt—where they are at all—among a president's support base. We know now, too, that a president's purported skills at schmoozing, twisting arms, and congressional lobbying add virtually nothing to getting what he (or she) wants from Congress. That was a lot more than we knew prior to the publication of Presidential Power. Neustadt gave us the ideas to work with, and a newer (and now older) generation of political scientists, reared on Neustadt but armed with the tools of scientific inquiry, could put some of his propositions to an empirical test. That the empirical tests demonstrate that several of these propositions are wrong comes with the territory. That is how science progresses. But the reality is that there was almost nothing of a propositional nature prior to Neustadt.

### AND – EVEN IF they win the entire thesis of political capital – there is only an 8 percent risk of a link

Matthew N Beckmann and Vimal Kumar 11, Associate Professor of Political Science at UC Irvine, econ prof at the Indian Institute of Tech, “Opportunism in Polarization”, Presidential Studies Quarterly; Sep 2011; 41, 3

The final important piece in our theoretical model—presidents' political capital— also finds support in these analyses, though the results here are less reliable. Presidents operating under the specter of strong economy and high approval ratings get an important, albeit moderate, increase in their chances for prevailing on "key" Senate roll-call votes (b = .10, se = .06, p < .10). Figure 4 displays the substantive implications of these results in the context of polarization, showing that going from the lower third of political capital to the upper third increases presidents' chances for success by 8 percentage points (in a setting like 2008). Thus, political capital's impact does provide an important boost to presidents' success on Capitol Hill, but it is certainly not potent enough to overcome basic congressional realities. Political capital is just strong enough to put a presidential thumb on the congressional scales, which often will not matter, but can in close cases.

## Saudi

Impact D

### War inevitable and No Escalation

Fettweis, Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College, ‘7

(Christopher, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” *Survival*, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98)

Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni-Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely. Wider war No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam's rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co-religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare.

#### 4 billion – 4.6 billion

#### ( ) US fracking boom now. This should non-unique Saudi perception.

Hudson ‘13

Alexandra Hudson – Correspondent with Reuters Berlin – Reuters – Feb 3, 2013 – http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/03/us-europe-shale-idUSBRE91204Z20130203

The United States is enjoying an energy bonanza thanks to shale gas, making it a magnet for industry, reducing import dependence and challenging Europe as it battles to dig itself out of recession, energy officials say.¶ Panelists at a weekend security conference in Munich warned Europe must develop a strategy on how to tap its own resources in order to keep energy costs competitive, or risk seeing power-intensive industries locate elsewhere.¶ "The shale gas and oil boom is already underway. As Europe continues to debate it, North America is reaping the advantages," said Jorma Ollila, Chairman of Royal Dutch Shell (RDSa.L).¶ Just a week ago Shell signed a $10 billion shale gas deal with Ukraine - the biggest contract yet in Europe - which could help Ukraine ease its reliance on Russian gas imports.¶ Ukraine is said to have Europe's third-largest shale gas reserves at 42 trillion cubic feet (1.2 trillion cubic meters), according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.¶ Its reserves are dwarfed by those of France however, estimated to be Europe's largest at 180 trillion cubic feet.¶ France has banned the procedure, known as fracking which is used to extract shale gas and which involves pumping vast quantities of water and chemicals at high pressure through drill holes to prop open shale rocks.¶ Environmentalists fear it could increase seismic risks and pollute drinking water. U.S. officials question this and say that thanks to the higher proportion of gas use the United States has had its lowest carbon dioxide emissions in 20 years.¶ "Observing this from across the Atlantic it is really quite remarkable that there should be a ban or a go-slow on this development in Europe, really without any facts," said Daniel Yergin, Vice-Chairman of IHS Cambridge Energy Research.¶ Fracking is used to produce a third of U.S. natural gas he said, showing the environmental impact can be managed.¶ SHALE SCRAMBLE¶ World energy market flows already reflect North America's scramble to exploit shale oil and gas and highlight the potential prize Europe is ignoring.¶ "The U.S. internal energy revolution and the radical increases in production of oil and gas have boosted gas production by 25 percent and seen oil import dependence drop from 60 percent to 40 percent, and expected to decline further to 30 percent," said Carlos Pascual, the U.S. special envoy for energy affairs.¶ While Europe retains deep environmental concerns it also acknowledges that with the price of gas in the United States just a third of that in Germany, its industry is already suffering the effects.¶ German Economy Minister Philipp Roesler said: "Many German firms have opted for (relocation to) the United States, saying energy prices were the decisive factor...We are already seeing that we are suffering with our higher energy prices…it affects our own competiveness."¶ Addressing the panel in Munich European Union Commissioner Guenther Oettinger said Europe should be in a position to produce enough shale gas to replace its depleting conventional gas reserves, so as not to become more dependent on imports.¶ RUSSIA UNAFRAID¶ A greater abundance of gas could threaten the dominance of Russia's gas exports and pressure prices. The United States seized Russia's spot as the world's largest gas producer in 2012, and is due to produce significantly more from 2015.¶ "I believe that the shale revolution is something positive, a chance for all of us to launch technologies, intensify competitiveness, make our countries more energy secure, and reduce costs," said Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak.¶ Russia is focusing on boosting exports to energy-hungry Asia and developing infrastructure to transport gas eastwards.¶ A recent confidential study by the German intelligence agency (BND) suggested the United States could turn from being the world's greatest energy importer into an oil and gas exporter by 2020, reducing its dependence on the Middle East and thereby giving it much more freedom in policy making.